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I
Preface
Planning  could  be  defined  as  preparing  for  actions  through  a 
methodological approach that will lead to the “right” decisions to be taken. 
Planning is  the first  step in any successful  project,  a  fact  lead Israel  to 
promote its planning strategies to adopt the planning policies in a manner 
that makes use of the regional political situation in which Israel can adjust 
its planning policies to serve its national targets. The Israeli urban planning 
policies  has  planted  illegally  hundred  of  thousands  of  housing  units  to 
create new civic centers and to find out new regional cities formed by the 
imposed  settlements  which  are  spread  throughout  the  West  Bank 
devastating the Palestinian agglomerations and preventing any continuity 
among the Palestinian cities.
The  thesis  deals   with  the  Israeli  planning  policies  followed  in  East 
Jerusalem with all its dimensions (logistical, cultural, economical, political, 
etc.), besides it develops a comprehensive historical analysis of the Israeli 
Planning Policies which created the fragmented Palestinian Landscape in 
East Jerusalem. 
This study is organized in seven chapters, chapter one is an introductive 
chapter.  Chapter  two  identifies  the  current  planning  situation  in  East 
Jerusalem. Chapter three explores the unilateral Israeli planning policies in 
Jerusalem.  Chapter  four  deals  with  the  open/green  spaces  and  open 
Landscapes  policies  in  Jerusalem.  Chapter  five  describes  the  planning 
paradigm in East Jerusalem. Chapter six clears out conclusions and future 
scenarios. Finally, chapter seven draws up the recommendations. 
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SUMMARY
__________________________________________
Planning is considered the first step in any successful project, planning has 
different  types  and  paradigms,  Urban  Planning is  one  of  the  most 
important  fields of  planning that  is  needed for  the development  process 
needed to sustain the nations’ resources and prosperity.
After the unification of East and West Jerusalem in 1968, the Jerusalem 
Municipality has been preparing the master plans of the city, besides, town 
planning schemes for all the existing neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, so that 
planning has been completed for the entire built-up area. Despite the fact that 
East  Jerusalem  is  considered  as  one  region,  the  Israeli  planners  have 
fragmented its neighborhoods by their town planning schemes and they have 
disconnected it from the West Bank. As well as, the Israeli planning policies 
have  been  expropriating  the  Palestinian  lands  (24,500  dunams  in  East 
Jerusalem) mainly for the construction of new  neighborhoods intended for 
the Jewish population.
Thus approximately one-third of East Jerusalem has been removed from the 
reserves of land available to the Arab population. Of the remaining area, only 
some 9,100 dunams (approximately 13% of the total area of East Jerusalem 
prior  to  the  expropriations)  are  zoned  for  residential  construction; 
additional  planning  is  needed  in  many  of  these  areas  before  building 
permits may be received. Thus the planning of the east of the city has almost 
been completed and valid town plans exist. Yet these do not meet the needs 
of the population that lives in East Jerusalem nor allow for the development 
of this area, as will be indicated in this study.
The  Research  deals  with  the  Israeli  planning  policies  followed  in  East 
Jerusalem with all its dimensions (logistical, cultural, economical, political, 
etc.), besides it develops a comprehensive historical analysis of the Israeli 
Planning Policies which created the fragmented Palestinian Landscape in 
East  Jerusalem,  and  suggests  future  scenarios  for  the  final  status  of 
Jerusalem. 
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__________________________________________
ملخص
__________________________________________
 يعد التخطيط هو الخطوة الساسية الولى لي مشروع ناجح. يشتمل التخطيط عدة انماظ و أششكال،
 ان التخطيط الحضري يعتبر من اهم حقول التخطيط الذي يشؤطر و ينظشم العمليشات التنمويشة بششكل
يضمن حفظ الموارد و حق الديمومة للجيال القادمة.
 م ، عملشت بلديشة القشدس8691بعد توحيد مدينة القدس ) لتشمل القدس الغربية و الشرقية( فشي عشام 
 على تخطيط المدينة بمنظور يخدم البعد السرائيلي من خلل وضع المخطشط الهيكلشي و مخططشات
 الحياء للقدس الشرقية ،حتى الن جهشزت بلديشة القشدس جميشع المخططشات للمنشاطق القائمشة. علشى
 الرغم من ان المدينة الشرقية تعتبر متواصلة كوحدة واحدة، ال ان المخطط السشرائيلي عمشل علشى
 تقطيع احيائها و عزلها عن التواصل الجغرافي فيما بينها و بين الضفة الغربية. علوة على ذلك، ان
سياسات التخطيط السرائيلية تعمل على مصادرة الراضي الفلسطينية من اهالي القشدس الششرقية )
 دونما( لغراض انشاء احياء ووحد سكنية استيطانية يهودية.00542
 نتيجة لهذه السياسات المنحازة لصالح اليهود و المستوطنين، فان ما يقارب على ثلث اراضي القدس
  % مششن31 دونم )0019الشرقية تم ازالتها من الراضي العربية الشاغرة، و المساحة المتبقية فقط 
 مساحة القدس الشرقية قبل مصادرة الراضي منها( تم تخصيصها لستخدام البناء السكني، و لتعقيد
 عمليشات البنشاء فشان التخطيشط السشرائيلي يعتشبر هشذه المنشاطق بحاجشة الشى المزيشد مشن العمليشات
 التخطيطية قبل اصدار رخص البناء. و عليه، نجد ان مخططات الحياء تعتبر كاملة و جشاهزة لشدى
 البلدية، ال ان هذه المخططات لتخدم احتياجات السكان لتلك المناطق، و ل تتيشح الفرصشة لعمليشات
التنمية بأن تتقدم كما سيتم توضيحه في هذه الدراسة.
 جاءت الدراسة منظمة في سبعة فصول دراسية ، حيث كان الفصل الول فصل مقدمة. الفصل
 الثاني يعرض وضع التخطيط القائم في القدس الشرقية. الفصل الثالث يتحدث عن سياسات التخطيط
 السرائيلية احادية الجانب في القدس ، الفصل الرابع يتحدث عن سياسات الفضاءات الخضراء و
  و الفصل السادس،المفتوحة بالقدس، الفصل الخامس يسستكشف نمط التخطيط في القدس الشرقية
 يطرح ملخصات و سيناريوهات لمستقبل القدس،  و في الختام، جاء الفصل السابع  ليضع
التوصيات.
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Chapter One
n
Introduction 
n
1.1   Introduction
Planning could be defined as preparing for actions, besides, planning is the first step in any 
successful project, a fact lead Israel to promote its planning strategies to adopt the planning 
policies in a manner that makes use of the regional political situation in which Israel can 
adjust its planning policies to serve its national targets. The Israeli urban planning policies 
has planted hundred of thousands of housing units to create new civic centers and to find 
out new regional cities formed by the imposed settlements which are spread throughout the 
West  Bank  devastating  the  Palestinian  agglomerations  and  preventing  any  continuity 
among the Palestinian cities (Efrat, 1984).
Cultures  standing  out  of  our  homeland  centre  may  have  not  the  motivations  and 
justifications which can stop the Israeli planners who are aiming through enlarging their 
settlements’ centers to impose wide changes of those centers to become new urban nodes 
and regional centers. This centre is apparent through the settlements which are called the 
stars. The existence of these settlements create subordination in the surrounding economy 
and  policies,  devour  the  available  un  built-up  areas,  and  besiege  the  Palestinian 
agglomerations  with  their  resources  that  may  form  the  future  infrastructure  of  the 
independent Palestinian state (Friedman, 2003).   
1.2   Literature Review
The  Israeli  planning  policies  have  witnessed  different  plans  according  to  the  different 
political  situation  in  the  area.  In  general,  all  these  plans  were  aiming  to  destroy  the 
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Palestinian  landscape  and  to  devastate  the  future  possible  hopes  of  self  controlled 
Palestinian territories. One of those powerful plans is (The Stars) which has been modified 
to include the construction of the apartheid wall that has been established around the West 
Bank cities and villages. The construction of this wall made the Israeli Planners implement 
their plans in reduced time period, without the wall this period could extend to about 20 
years  to  achieve  the  desired  aims;  that  why this  project  is  being  implemented  without 
returning to the Palestinian – Israeli Agreements. Objectives of the apartheid wall (Kutcher, 
2004) are as follows:
1. The apartheid wall itself is a changeable political border, so that we find (Olmart) 
-Israel prime minister- has changed the wall path to include the vast settlements in 
the West Bank.
2. The  apartheid  wall  draws  the  borders  of  the  Greater  Jerusalem  Project, 
consequently; it forms a physical barrier that makes Jerusalem out of relation and 
continuity with the West Bank. Besides it contributes the existence of four large 
settlement centers around the four directions of Jerusalem. So that (Kefar Asion) 
will form the southern leg of Greater Jerusalem, (Ma’alieh Adomiem) shall form the 
eastern leg and its geography will extend to reach the area of Dead Sea. The centre 
of the western leg is (Giv’at Ze’ev), and the centre of the northern leg is (Chilo).
3. The apartheid wall will confiscate part of the West Bank ground water main basins. 
4. The  apartheid  wall  shall  devastate  the  Palestinian  cultural  heritage  centers  and 
tourism aspects. 
                                 3 
Besides  all  above,  Israel  has  implanted  within  the  Jerusalem municipal  boundaries  16 
settlements  with  huge  Jewish  population  besieging  the  Palestinian  Neighborhoods  with 
massive Jewish blocks see (map 1).
To  guarantee  the  success  of  the  (The  Stars)  plan,  (Weiss  Plan)  was  proposed,  its 
implementation  needed 2.5 billion  dollars  per  year  for a  total  time period of 10 years. 
(Weiss) suggests that the plan shall be financed by the pubic and private sectors in Israel, 
besides the international monetary supports. Weiss Plan proposes the joining of almost all 
the main Israeli settlements, and 30 other settlements are left for future merging with other 
settlements (Kutcher, 2004). 
According to the understanding of Sharon’s Plan, we have to determine the area that shall 
be given to the Palestinians to establish their state that does neither have the terrestrial land 
and aerial access, nor have ground/surface water under its control. When (Weiss) was asked 
“How shall the Palestinians drink?” he answered: “ the water of Litany River in Lebanon 
pours in the sea, it could be transferred to the West Bank in agreement with the Lebanese 
Government, and could be financed annually!” (Kutcher, 2004).
“Sharon’s  Plan”  according  to  the  engineering  description  is  considered  a  quadripartite 
frame that captures West Bank within two directions,  east from Jericho to the south of 
Hebron  (to  Alzaheriah  and  Tarkumia).  This  plan  will  provide  the  Zionistic  residential 
densities needed to make the project of Greater Jerusalem within the eastern leg form the 
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main centre that shall form the skeleton by its bypass roads (about 80% of those roads are 
completed). Therefore, the southern leg will be the main artery of this plan(Kutcher, 2004).. 
                                 5 
Map 1: Areas of expansion in Jerusalem settlements between 1996 and 2005
Source: Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ 2006
Sharon has proposed establishing 11 new settlements, and developing two main settlements 
along the Green Line (Friedman, 2003). Those two settlements are the main foundation of 
the Greater Jerusalem Project. One of them is (Mod’een) along the southern line that links 
between the southern part of Jerusalem and the eastern part besides Jericho till Alkamran 
Region and  up  to  Aljalil  villages.  According  to  Sharon  plan  we find  four  settlements, 
( Bitar and Lahav) lie in the southern region, (Roglit and Shkiv) in the west, these two 
settlements are extending to complete the logistic extension of (Mod’een Settlement) and 
(Jiv’at  Ze’ev)  in  the  west.  And  to  save  balance  of  settlements  growth,  evidences  are 
apparent to expand the region of (Alnabi Somail) to be extending easterly to (Al’adasi) hill 
that lies in the west part of Beit Hanina, see (map 1) to notice the Israeli  settlements’ 
expansion (1996-2005)  .  
The  eleven  proposed  settlements  are  (Mas’ot  Goborin,  Arkhovit,  Agoz,  Hrob,  Miged, 
Mertam,  Debirem,  Eastern  Sensana,  Western  Sensana,  Hiran,  Betir  north,  Betir  South) 
(Kutcher, 2004). These settlements form military areas attaining political and economical 
potentials  for  Israel.  Besides,  they will  be the  catastrophic  barrier  that  will  prevent  the 
Palestinian rural areas to develop and get use of their agricultural lands. 
(Goborin Settlement) will be expanded on the Palestinian Village called Sorif (at Hebron), 
Arkhovit Agoz be expanded on the Palestinian Village called Tarkomia (at Hebron), Hrob 
and Shkiv will be established in front of (Ethna town) in Hebron. As to (Miged settlement) 
shall break the continuity of the southern Palestinian villages and those Palestinian villages 
lying in the eastern part of the West Bank.
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When  (Benjamin  Netanyahu  –  Israel  Prime  Minister  from  June,  1996  to  July,  1999) 
announced the addition of 30,000 dwellings in (Efrat), he gave details of “Sharon’s Plan” 
which was called the (The Stars), when Sharon was a Housing Minister (Al-Ahmadi, 1999). 
Therefore, (Sharon) moved to renew his plan and to cancel Oslo Agreement by ignoring the 
whole  Palestinian-Israeli  Agreements  and  violating  the  international  laws  and  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  ICJ  as  well  as  the  United  Nations’  decisions  against  the 
Israeli unilateral plans and strategies. “Sharon’s Plan” is that belt which is guyed around the 
Palestinian agglomerations in the West Bank, to deplete their resources, and break their 
hopes down from coming back to the occupied land in 1948.
Sharon’s Plan was put to determine the demographic densities as a form of Israeli majority 
that  will  need great residential  agglomerations in the West Bank. On the other hand, it 
provides  powerful  open  areas,  that  can  be  used  to  link  the  Jordan  River  and  the 
Mediterranean, the southern and the northern parts of the West Bank, and the area along the 
Egyptian – Israeli boarders (Friedman, 2003).   
The Israeli planner tries to weaken the Palestinian memory, since he/she believes that as he 
passes the second plan to the Palestinian, the first one will have been already forgotten. 
Israel  has succeeded to change the Palestinian international  case to become a problem. 
Therefore, we have to do our best to go back to the whole case and integrate it to declare to 
the world that Sharon’s Plan is a planned problem.
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1.3   Problem Statement:
Israeli  Planning paradigms ignore the Oslo Agreement,  as well  as, the Road Map Plan. 
They have  made  the  Jerusalem Governorate  a  non-negotiable  issue;  also  they hide  the 
Palestinian refugees return hopes in the darkness files. In the absence of political stability in 
the  region,  Israel  makes  use  of  the  political  events  to  create  new  methodologies  and 
planning directions to serve its benefits in a manner far away from the signed agreements 
with the Palestinian and against the international laws. Consequently,  the Israeli scissors 
has not stopped neither cutting the Palestinian lands nor plundering their natural resources, 
besides,  devastating  the  Palestinian  Infrastructure,  economy,  agriculture,  historical  and 
cultural heritage, tourism, etc. This Israeli Planning Policies have damaged the Palestinian 
physical and social landscape (Dumper, 2002; Khamaisi, and Nasrallah, 2003). 
The construction of the apartheid wall has lead to three main pivots making the Palestinians 
lose their natural and historical features, besides, their character components. Those pivots 
are, first: underground water basins are within the apartheid wall pathway.  Second: The 
Palestinian historical and cultural heritages are within the apartheid wall pathway. Third: 
Isolating the West Bank. The absence of the integrated Palestinian studies that criticize and 
disapprove the Israeli Plans has aggravated the problem, and negatively reflected to the 
Palestinian  potentials  (economical,  political,  social,  etc.)  that  are  supposed  to  form the 
foundation of the Palestinian independent state, accordingly, hopes are contracted for the 
existence of the Palestinian independent state that has clear boundaries and jurisdictions.
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1.4   Research Significance:
The Research deals  with the Israeli planning policies followed in East Jerusalem with all 
its  dimensions  (logistical,  cultural,  economical,  political,  etc.),  besides  it  develops  a 
comprehensive  historical  analysis  of  the  Israeli  Planning  Policies  which  created  the 
fragmented Palestinian Landscape in East Jerusalem. 
1.5   Objectives: 
1. Analyzing  the  Israeli  planning  policies,  and  studying  their  influences  upon  the 
Palestinian and Landscape in Jerusalem.
2. Providing  comprehensive  study  that  shows  the  broken  Palestinian  Landscape 
resulting from the on-going Israeli Policies in Jerusalem.
3. Providing suggestions and policies that are to be followed to minimize the damage 
and harm. 
1.6   Research Questions:
o The Israeli plans were found before occupying the West Bank , their contents were 
developed and expanded within the historical growth of Israel, will these plans stop 
developing and expanding, or shall they be reformed?
o How do the Israeli Planning Policies alternate according to the Arab demographic 
factor?
o What are the main planning problems in East Jerusalem?
o What are the main features of planning regime in Jerusalem?
o How do the Israeli Planning Policies use the open/green spaces to control the East 
Jerusalem Development?
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1.7   Research Methodology:
Mainly, to cover the research dimensions, the historical,  analytical, comparative, and 
the descriptive approaches shall be used. The current impacts resulting by the Israeli 
planning  policies  will  be  discussed,  besides,  future  scenarios  for  Jerusalem will  be 
proposed.  Related  literature  and  maps  shall  be  studied  and  evaluated.  Available 
Statistics were reviewed, in addition to Personal interviews. 
                                 10 
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Chapter Two
 
East Jerusalem – The Current Planning Situation
 
2.1   Introduction
East Jerusalem is the area that was annexed to the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem in 1968, 
extending from Kafr 'Aqab in the north to Sur Bahir in the south, this area totals approximately 
70,500 dunams. The Jerusalem Municipality has prepared town planning schemes for almost all 
the existing neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, so  that planning has been completed for the 
entire built-up area (with the exception of the Shu'fat refugee camp, which is included in the 
"East Gate" town plan, currently in the initial planning stage). It should be recalled, however, 
that East Jerusalem also includes some 24,500 dunams that have been expropriated, mainly 
for  the  construction  of  new  neighborhoods  intended  for  the  Jewish  population.  Thus 
approximately  one-third  of  East  Jerusalem  has  been  removed  from  the  reserves  of  land 
available  to  the  Arab  population.  Of  the  remaining  area,  only  some  9,100  dunams 
(approximately 13% of the total area of East Jerusalem prior to the expropriations) are zoned 
for residential  construction; additional planning is needed in many of these areas before 
building permits may be received. Thus the planning of the east of the city has almost been 
completed and valid town plans exist. Yet these do not meet the needs of the population that 
lives in East Jerusalem nor allow for the development of this area, as will be indicated in this 
study (Khamaisi, 2003).
The research presented in this study relates to the planning situation in East Jerusalem after 
forty years of Israeli rule. Statutory planning has far-reaching ramifications for the possibilities 
open to individual residents regarding building (whether or not they may build, and according 
to what conditions). It also determines the character of the public  domain. Forty years of 
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planning have left an indelible mark on the geography and demography of East Jerusalem. As 
part of the research work many urban town plans for the neighborhoods of East Jerusalem 
were reviewed, including both approved plans and those deposited for public inspection.
2.2   Past Planning Present Situation 
As a result of the Six Day War (in 1967) a planning vacuum in East Jerusalem was created 
which has only gradually been filled by the Israeli planners. After the city was, the formal 
validity of the Jordanian plans applying to this area was nullified. During the initial period 
after  the  1967  war  these  plans  served  as  "shadow  plans"  guiding  decision  makers  in 
granting building permits on an ad hoc basis. In 1975 areas were defined in East Jerusalem 
in which building permits could be received subject to various conditions. These conditions 
established a number of  permitted construction densities: in "class 5" residential areas 50% 
density was allowed on two floors; in "class 6" residential areas 25% was allowed on one 
floor. Building permits were issued subject to these conditions and in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 78 of the Planning and Building Law, which is designed to enable the 
authorities to issue  building permits during the period between the announcement of the 
preparation of a town planning scheme and its approval (Hyman, 1996).
The use of Section 78 was intended to solve urgent problems pending the preparation of 
general outline plans for the neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. By its very nature this was 
clearly intended to be a temporary arrangement. However, since the preparation of general 
outline plans began only in the 1980s, the provisions of Section 78 became a dominant tool 
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in the planning of East Jerusalem (Hyman, 1996).
In the early 1980s it was decided to prepare master plans for all the neighborhoods of East 
Jerusalem.  Most  of  these  have  since  been  completed:  23  have  been  prepared  and  19 
approved, while the remaining 4 plans are at advanced stages of the approval process. Four 
additional plans are at various stages of the planning process (East Central Business District, 
Slopes of the Mt. Of Olives, "East Gate", and Givat Hamatos.) A large number  of small-
scale  urban town plans  have also been submitted  on behalf  of private  landowners;  these 
usually relate to the local planning of a single plot, the establishment of divisions, zoning, 
changing the contours of a building, etc. Some of these plans have been approved, some have 
been rejected and some are still being considered by the planning committees  (Friedman, 
2003).
As noted in the introduction, more than one-third of the total area of East Jerusalem has 
been expropriated for the establishment of new Jewish neighborhoods in the east of the 
city: the Jewish Quarter, East Talpiot, Ramot, Gilo, Neve Ya'akov, Pisgat Zeev, The French 
Hill, Ramat Eshkol, Maalot Dafna, Atarot and, most recently, Abu Ghneim (Har Homa).
Of the 45,500 dunams remaining after the expropriations, planning has been completed and 
approved for approximately 38.7% of the area (17,600 dunams). Planning procedures for the 
remaining area (61.3%) have yet to be completed: approximately 7,100 dunams are  at  an 
advanced stage of planning, and an additional 5,000 dunams are at preliminary planning 
stages. Of the planned areas approximately 40% are defined as open space in which no 
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construction is permitted; approximately 37% are zoned for residential construction. The 
approved plans earmark approximately 6,100 dunams for residential construction. Of this 
total,  approximately 1,000 dunams require the preparation of  unification and reparceling 
plans that will take many years to prepare and approve before building permits can be issued. 
Therefore, approximately 11.2% of the total area of East Jerusalem only is available to the 
Palestinian population for residential construction. A study of the aerial photographs shows 
that this construction is possible mainly in existing built-up areas (Arnon, 1998).
The total potential for additional housing units in the approved plans (excluding areas requiring 
unification and reparceling) is approximately 5,000. From this number one must  deduct  an 
unknown  number  of  housing  units  for  which  building  permits  cannot  be  received  for 
various  reasons.  Of  the  total  area  of  East  Jerusalem  prior  to  the  expropriations, 
approximately 7.3% only is available for residential construction, and approximately 0.6% for 
commercial and  industrial construction. The remaining areas are zoned for various needs 
that do not enable private sector exploitation, or are unplanned areas. Consequently, small area 
of  the total  area of East  Jerusalem is available  to the Palestinian sector for any kind of 
private sector development (Arnon, 1998) see figure 2.1.
According to  (Arnon, 1998) anyone can clearly notice and realize the bias in the Israeli planning 
policies adopted in Jerusalem as shown in table 2.1.
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37%
4%26%
33%
Approved zones
Unapproved Zone
Unplanned Zone
Expropriated lands
F
Despite the Israeli plans and policies to restrict the development of East Jerusalem and the 
Palestinian Arab Neighborhoods, the Arab rate of increase was always bigger than the Jewish 
rate. Table 2.2 illustrates the population development of the Jewish and Arab in Jerusalem. 
However, further and more accurate surveys are to be run as soon as possible by Palestinian 
technical people (NGOs, CBOs) to clear out the real up to date population reflecting the 
Jewish into Jerusalem immigration and the Arab away from Jerusalem migration.
Also a comparative between “the time period of the year 1967 and the year 1997” according 
to the Jerusalem statistical abstract 1996 of how many houses were provided to both sectors 
in Jerusalem (the Arabs and the Jews) - see figure 2.2 - absolutely will clear out again the 
Israeli discriminative planning policies that are being practiced on the Palestinian residents in 
East Jerusalem to force them to leave their places and move outwards Jerusalem whether to 
the West Bank or even out of Palestine.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of approved, unapproved, unplanned and expropriated Land in East 
Jerusalem*
Note [approved: means zoning is being finished and landuses is completely assigned , unapproved:  
means that the final landuses are not approved by the municipality till finishing the residents and 
owners objections]
Source: Researcher, 2006. 
* Information by (McFadden, 2001)
Israeli Planning Policies In Jerusalem *
Construction Densities
After expropriation
In 1968
(Units per dunam)
Average Housing 
Density
(Person per room)
Population Living in 
Densities ≥  3
(Person per room)
Population Density 
(Person per dunam)
Jewish Palestinian Jewish Palestinian Jewish Palestinian Jewish Palestinian
6.1 2.2 1.1 2.2 2.4% 27.8% 21.7 14.6
The construction 
density and the 
population density per 
dunam are lower in 
East Jerusalem than in 
West Jerusalem
This reflects the fact 
that Palestinians are 
unable to exploit the 
un-built area and are 
compacted in their 
homes. Also this 
reflects the low income 
rates in the Arab sectors
Arab residents of 
Jerusalem are relatively 
"rich" in land, but 
"poor" in floor space. 
Also this reflects the 
low income rates in the 
Arab sectors
This reflects the high 
rate of the Israeli 
horizontal expansion
In West Jerusalem
Year Number of Residents (Thousands) Percentage
Year Palestinians Israelis Total Palestinians Israelis
1967 68.6 197.7 266.3 25.76 74.24
1972 83.5 230.3 313.8 26.61 73.39
1983 122.4 306.3 428.7 28.55 71.45
1985 130 327.2 457.2 28.43 71.57
1990 146.3 378.2 524.5 27.89 72.11
1992 155.5 401 556.5 27.94 72.06
1995 181.8 420.9 602.7 30.16 69.84
1998 196.1 433.6 629.7 31.14 68.86
2000 208.7 448.8 657.5 31.74 68.26
2001 215.4 454.6 670 32.15 67.85
2002 221.9 458.6 680.5 32.61 67.39
2003 228.7 464.5 693.2 32.99 67.01
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  In Arab Residents 27.8%
Table 2.1:   Comparisons between planning policies in East and West Jerusalem*
Source: Researcher, 2006. 
*Information by (Arnon, 1998)
Table 2.2: Jerusalem Population Development (1967-2003)
Source: Statistical yearbook of Jerusalem, 2004. 
12,600 
Housing Units 
existed in 
East Jerusalem
 in June 1967
10,473 
Housing Units were 
added between 1967 and 
August 1996
Number of housing units 
in the Arab sector grew 
by 83%
During this period
1967-1997
One housing unit has 
been added for each 
additional 9.7 Palestinian 
residents
During this period
1967-1997
57500
Housing Units 
existed in 
West Jerusalem
 in June 1967
70692
Housing Units were 
added between 1967 and 
August 1996
Number of housing units 
in the Jews sector grew 
by 123%
During this period
1967-1997
One housing unit has 
been added for each 
additional 3 
Jewish residents
During this period
1967-1997
Jews in 
Jerusalem
1967-1996
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Arabs in 
Jerusalem
1967-1996
It is true that the nominal growth of the Jewish population during this 
period was higher than that of the Arab population.  However, a 
calculation of the relationship between the increase in the number of 
housing units and the increase in the population reflects a clear 
asymmetry between the two sectors.
Figure 2.2: Comparison of housing providing in Jerusalem 1967-1997*
Source: Researcher, 2006. 
* information by (Arnon, 1998)
2.3   Planning Problems in East Jerusalem
An examination of the overall planning map of East Jerusalem and an analysis of the tables 
of land usages reveal a number of planning problems.
2.3.1   Absence of overall planning for East Jerusalem
This is the fundamental planning problem in the east of the city. The plans for this area have 
been prepared in isolation without overall systemic planning relating to East  Jerusalem in 
its  entirety.  The  overall  planning  map  shows that  each  neighborhood  has  been  planned 
separately with the objective of solving local residential problems (Arnon, 1998). These plans 
were prepared at different periods, do not relate to the area as a whole, and do not present a 
perspective which unites the neighborhoods into a single urban fabric.
The result of this approach is that there is no factoring in of transportation or other services 
on the urban level, beyond individual neighborhoods. This includes such facilities as institutions 
of higher education, commercial and employment centers, leisure areas,  health and cultural 
facilities, etc (Arnon, 1998).
2.3.2   Open landscape area
Most of the plans allocate extensive areas for open landscape area. Approximately 40% of the 
total planned area of East Jerusalem is zoned for this purpose. Construction is  completely 
forbidden  in  open  landscape  area,  where  the  permitted  usages  include  forestry,  groves, 
agriculture, and existing roads. Unlike open public land, open green spaces are not expropriated 
from their owners and remain private property.  The zoning of areas for open landscape in 
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Jerusalem is influenced by a number of factors (McFadden, 2001) :
a) The  maintenance  of  the  wadis  (dry  river  beds)  as  open  areas,  while  concentrating 
construction  on  the  ridges  of  hills.  This  is  one  of  the  main  planning  principles  in 
Jerusalem.
b) Preservation of the visual basin of the Old City. The visual basin of the Old City is a 
particularly sensitive area because of its landscape and its deep religious and historical 
value. This basin is both a national and international asset. Building plan (AM/9 - 1986 ) 
for the Old City, which governs this area has established planning principles intended to 
allow development while strictly preserving the natural and rural-style landscape of the 
area. The detailed plans for the neighborhoods of Abu Tor, Silwan, Ras Al-Amud, A-
Shaykh, A-Suwaneh and A-Tur were all prepared on the basis of this plan.
c) Demographic and political  considerations:  The planning of Jerusalem is influenced by 
government policy dictating that a proportion of 78% Jews and 22% Arabs should be 
maintained in Jerusalem. To this end, it has been necessary to restrict the development of 
the neighborhoods in the east of the city. One consequence of this policy has been the 
zoning of areas for open landscape on a basis that relates not to professional planning or 
design  considerations,  but  rather  to  arbitrary  decisions  establishing  the  limits  of 
construction.
The clearest  example  of  this  policy is  the  planning  for  the Arab neighborhoods  of  Beit 
Hanina and Shu'fat in northern Jerusalem (Arnon, 1998). When the planning process began, 
extensive areas in these neighborhoods were earmarked for residential construction on the scale 
20
of  some 12,500 housing units. On the basis of government policy,  the district committee 
decided to restrict  construction to 7,500 housing units and to earmark large areas for open 
landscape. Numerous objections to these decisions were submitted by private landowners whose 
land was earmarked for open landscape. The committee decided to remove these areas from the 
scope of the plan, since it could not really counter the objectors' arguments in terms of planning 
considerations. The removal of the open landscape area from the planning in no way alters 
their legal status, since these areas are earmarked for open landscape in the general outline 
plan for north Jerusalem (Plan 3000B -1991 / Jerusalem Municipality) (McFadden, 2001).
In the south of Jerusalem, extensive areas are earmarked for open landscape. The plan for Sur 
Bahir earmarks approximately 42% of the planning area for open landscape, while the plan for 
Arab A-Sawahara allocates no less than 60% of the total area of the plan for this purpose. The 
areas earmarked for open landscape include several clusters of  existing buildings as well as 
isolated buildings.  Some of these buildings  are  long-standing while  others have been built 
recently without permits. In Arab A-Sawahara, for example, built-up areas - particularly on the 
borders of the built-up zone - have been earmarked for open landscape. Zoning as open green 
spaces  means  that  house  owners  cannot  extend  their  homes  or  connect  to  infrastructure 
services.  The  instructions  attached  to  the  plans  include  a  clause  stating  that  in  "lawful" 
existing buildings within open green spaces, no additional building will be permitted, with the 
exception  of  extensions  required  for  the  purpose of sanitary improvements  to an existing 
building. In practice, the use of the word "lawful" prevents any building extension, since it is 
difficult  to  prove  that  long-standing  buildings  were  constructed  "legally,"  while  the  new 
buildings were built "unlawfully" (McFadden, 2001).
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In conclusion, therefore, one notes that in addition to the objective and professional planning 
considerations dictating the zoning of certain areas for open landscape, extensive  areas have 
been  zoned  for  this  purpose  on  the basis  of  political  and  demographic  considerations. 
Decision  makers  have  sought  to  limit  the development  of  areas  that  are  appropriate  and 
suitable for construction. It may be assumed that if design and planning principles were the 
sole criterion, much of these areas would have been zoned for construction.
2.3.3   Building density
Most of the plans for East Jerusalem establish a low rate of permitted construction density, 
i.e. rates of 50%, 37.5% and 25% (Khamaisi, 2003) [The construction density reflects the 
ratio  between the  permitted  built  up space  and the  size  of  the  plot.  For  example  50% 
building rights allow 500 m2 built up space on a plot of 1000 m2]. These figures may be 
appreciated when compared to those for the Jewish sector in Jerusalem. The building plan 
for the new neighborhood of Ramat Beit Hakerem, for example, proposed a building density of 
120%, while the plan for Ramat Rachel has a proposed density of 136% (McFadden, 2001).
The low rates of building density in East Jerusalem have been presented by Israeli decision 
makers  as  an attempt  to  preserve  the  rural-style  character  of  these  areas  from the  design 
perspective and on the basis of the assumption that the Arab population is not interested in 
urbanization. However, many Palestinians see this as no more than a pretext for the application 
of political considerations limiting the development of East Jerusalem.  Since the Palestinian 
population is not involved in the planning process it is impossible to determine whether and to 
what extent this policy indeed reflects urban Palestinian culture during the relevant period 
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(residence in  semi-rural  contexts)  and/or  an Israeli  attempt to impose rural  construction 
patterns on this population for demographic and  political reasons. Experience suggests that 
both claims are partially correct (Arnon, 1998).
A summary of the data in the zoning percentages in East Jerusalem Neighborhoods shows that 
approximately 60% of building  areas in East Jerusalem have been allocated a construction 
density of "Class 5" residential  level, i.e.  50% in two floors; a density of 37.5% has been 
established for 14% of the areas; and a density of 25% has been established for 4% of the areas. 
Only  for  21% of  the  areas  have  higher  urban-level  densities  of  75% and  70% has  been 
established. In fact, only the Arab neighborhoods of North Jerusalem (Beit Hanina and Shu'afat) 
have been defined as urban neighborhoods with a density of 75% in the central areas. Ramallah 
Road serves as a central  commercial route, lined by construction at a density of 150% on 
three floors for commercial and residential purposes. Though, there has been a tendency for the 
planning committees to approve higher levels of density in the rural areas, both in response 
to  existing development trends and with the goal of improving land exploitation. Thus, for 
example, the district committee has decided to increase the construction densities in Kafr Aqab 
from 50%, 25% and 10% to 75%, 70% and 50% respectively. In Sur Bahir and Um Tuba, the 
district committee has decided to increase the densities from 25% to 50% and from 50% to 
70% respectively.  This  decision  followed  the  submission  of  objections  to  the  plan  and 
reflected a desire to enable more efficient exploitation of the available land (Arnon, 1998).
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2.3.4   Allocation of land for public uses
All  the neighborhoods of  East  Jerusalem face a severe shortage of  space for public  use, 
including land for the establishment of educational institutions and other public services (health 
and cultural services, youth and sports facilities, welfare institutions such as senior  citizens' 
clubs, and so on) (Kroyanker, 2002). There is a sharp discrepancy between the allocation of 
land for public use in East Jerusalem and in the west of the city. In the plans for East Jerusalem, 
approximately 6% of the planned area is zoned for public buildings, while approximately 11-
14% is allocated for this purpose in West Jerusalem. The main reason for this is that most of 
the land in East Jerusalem is privately owned. As a result, it is difficult to locate sites for public 
institutions. In West Jerusalem most of the land is under public ownership. Two main approaches 
have  been  used  to  cope  with  the  need  to  allocate  land  for  public  uses in  East  Jerusalem 
(McFadden, 2001) : 
a) Unification and reparceling plans have been prepared according to  which a number  of 
privately-owned   plots    are unified   and   then   reparceled   after  deduction   of 
approximately 40% from each plot for public uses.
b) The expropriation of entire plots owned by the village, or expropriation of 40% of large 
privately-owned plots.
Planning measures in themselves cannot solve the problem, however. Even if sufficient land is 
zoned for these purposes, both the above-mentioned procedures make it difficult to implement 
public building projects.
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The plans for the Arab neighborhoods of North Jerusalem have addressed the problem of the 
allocation of land for public uses by means of unification and reparceling.  A public sector 
projected  needs  program  has  been  prepared  for  Beit  Hanina  and  Shu'afat  (based  on  the 
standards of the Israeli  Ministry of Housing) and approximately 400 dunams have been 
allocated for public buildings. In order to obtain these areas, numerous compounds have been 
earmarked for unification  and reparceling (Kutcher,  2004).  This is  a long and painstaking 
process that will take many years, during which construction in these areas (for both residential 
and public purposes) is frozen.
In plans for other areas, attempts have been made (in cooperation with the mukhtars or elders 
of the villages) to locate land owned by the village that may be used for public purposes, or to 
locate  large  privately-owned  plots  from  which  40%  (or  even  the  entire  plot)  may  be 
expropriated. However, this method yields only a part of the total area required for public 
uses,  and these plans show a sharp discrepancy between the areas  actually allocated for 
public buildings and the areas required according to the program.  In the plan for Arab A-
Sawahara,  for  example,  44  dunams  were  allocated  for  public  buildings;  according  to  a 
program prepared on the basis of maximum population capacity, 96 dunams are required for this 
purpose.
The  plan  for  Jabal  Mukabir  allocates  just  one  dunam  for  public  buildings,  on  the 
assumption that the residents of the neighborhood will use the educational facilities of Arab 
A-Sawahara.  The plan for Abu Tor allocates  10 dunams for the construction  of public 
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buildings, though the program requires 55 dunams. In Shaykh Jarrah and Bab A-Zahra 22 
dunams have been allocated for public uses, while the program requires 80  dunams. In A-
Shaykh Jarah 19 dunams have been allocated while approximately 50 dunams are needed, and in 
Belt Safafa 66 dunams have been allocated although there is a need for  119 dunams. In all 
these neighborhoods the shortage of public buildings will only become more acute as time passes 
(Arnon, 1998).
In the neighborhoods of Ras Al-Amud, Isawiyah, A-Suwaneh and A-Tur, sufficient land has been 
allocated  for  public  uses  in  the  plans,  but  problems  have  emerged  in  financing  the 
expropriations. This problem is due to financial difficulties on the part of the Municipality 
of Jerusalem, which needs funds to finance expropriations but has difficulty  budgeting the 
necessary amounts (Arnon, 1998).
Another example of the problems involved in allocating land for public buildings is the plan 
for Sur Bahir,  which earmarked 105 dunams for public  institutions.  The  deposited plan 
determined  that  these  areas  would be obtained  through the  preparation  of  a  building  and 
development plan for compounds defined in the plan. The plans for these  compounds are 
essentially unification and reparceling plans the approval of which depends on the consent 
of all the landowners within the compound. It was established that if the landowners' consent 
is  not obtained,  non-consensual plans for unification and  reparceling will be prepared.  As 
already noted, this is an extremely awkward process that has aroused considerable opposition 
among the residents. During the discussion of the  objections, it was decided to rescind the 
requirement for building and development plans since this would in practice lead to the freezing 
26
of all building in the area for many years.  However, the alternative means by which land 
becomes available for public uses -expropriations - is no less problematic, for financial and 
other reasons (Arnon, 1998).
2.3.5   Allocation of open public spaces
All the plans of the Arab Neighborhoods in East Jerusalem show a profound shortage of open 
public land, i.e. parks  and developed public gardens for the use of the local population. The 
limited allocation of land for gardens and parks is based on the fact that considerable areas 
are allocated for open landscape in East  Jerusalem. However,  the open spaces are actually 
undeveloped space that cannot serve as a substitute for public gardens, including playgrounds 
for children and space for leisure activities. On the other hand, in West Jerusalem in the Jewish 
neighborhoods and settlements large open public spaces are assigned as shown in (figure 2.3).
While in the Jewish neighborhoods whether in West Jerusalem or in East Jerusalem, there is no 
shortage of the public open spaces. On the contrary, the earmarked areas for the open public 
areas are earmarked on the high standards of planning as shown in (figure 2.3).
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Only 2.2% of the total area of East 
Jerusalem is earmarked for 
Open Public Spaces
In Ramat Beit Hakerem, 12% of the 
total planned area is earmarked for 
open public spaces
In Ramat Rachel, 19% of the total 
planned area is earmarked for open 
public spaces
Public Parks 
of Jerusalem occupy a total area of 
5,540 dunams
Only 324 dunams are in the Arab 
neighborhoods of East Jerusalem
5216 dunams are in the Jewish 
neighborhoods of Jerusalem
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of open public spaces in East & West Jerusalem*
Source: Researcher. 
* Information by (Arnon, 1998)
Each Jewish resident of the city is allocated approximately 12.4 square meters 
of gardens and parks close to his/her home, while each Arab resident is 
allocated 1.9 square meters.
This means that Arab residents have only 5.8% of the total area of parks close 
to their homes in the city, despite the fact that they constitute some 33% of 
the total population and live in residential areas that occupy 38% of the total 
area.
2.3.6   Allocation of commercial areas
The plans for East Jerusalem include almost no allocation of areas for commercial use, such as 
hotels and industrial zones. Allocations for these purposes are mainly on the basis  of local 
considerations reflecting existing land use rather than an overall perspective promoting the 
creation of employment possibilities for the residents of East Jerusalem. In all the plans for 
East  Jerusalem,  approximately 140 dunams were allocated  for  commercial  areas  -  just 
0.5% of the total area. In Beit Hanina and Shu'fat areas are allocated along Ramallah Road 
for commerce combined with residential uses. In Ras Al-Amud, Wadi Jawz and A-Suwaneh, 
areas are allocated for hotels in places where hotels already operate. Two additional plans - the 
East Central  Business District  and the plan for an industrial  zone adjacent  to  the Atarot 
airfield - have been prepared but have not yet been deposited (Jerusalem Municipality, 2001).
Table 2.3 shows the zoning in East Jerusalem according to Israeli planning.
Zoning 
Designation
Area (Dunams) % 
of Planned Areas
Residential 9178 37.2
Open Landscape Area 9564 38.8
Roads 3613 14.8
Public Buildings 901 3.6
Institutions 342 1.4
Open Public Area 374 1.5
Cemetery 109 0.4
Commercial Or Industrial Areas 143 0.6
Area Not Included In the Plan 431 1.7
TOTAL 24655 100
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Table 2.3: Zoning Designation under the Existing Town Plans in East Jerusalem
Source: Jerusalem Municipality, 1999.
2.4   Realizing Building Potential
In many neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, and particularly in central areas such as Abu Tor, 
Silwan,  Ras  Al-Amud,  A-Sawani,  A-Tur  and  Jabal  Mukabir  -  most  of  the  potential  for 
construction  has  already  been  exploited.  In  the  northern  Arab  neighborhoods  and  in  the 
neighborhoods  to  the  south  of  the  city  (Sur  Baher  and  Arab  A-Sawahara)  considerable 
potential  remains.  In  Arab  A-Sawahara,  for  example,  the  maximum  capacity  is 
approximately  1,650  housing  units.  In  Beit  Hanina  and  Shu'afat  the  potential  is 
approximately  1,800  units.  However,  this  potential  cannot  be  exploited  in  the  short  or 
medium term due to a variety of planning problems and bureaucratic,  legal  and financial 
obstacles.
The  planning  problems  will  be  appreciated  after  examining  the  clauses  in  the  planning 
instructions relating to the conditions for granting building permits. The bureaucratic,  legal 
and financial problems inherent in this process are discussed separately below.
2.4.1   Special conditions required in order to obtain building permits
  
2.4.1.1   Tracts for unification and reparceling
"In areas defined in the plan as areas for unification and reparceling, a building permit shall 
be issued solely after preparation of a detailed plan including unification and reparceling." 
This condition delays any possibility of new construction for many years, since the process of 
preparing and approving plans for unification and reparceling is  prolonged and painstaking 
(Jerusalem Municipality, 1994). A unification and reparceling plan provides for the unification 
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of a number of private plots which are then reparceled, after deduction of up to approximately 
up to 40% from each plot for public uses. The objective of the plan is to expropriate areas for 
public uses in such a manner that land is expropriated from all the landowners in an equitable 
manner. This is a prolonged process even in the context of the Jewish areas of West Jerusalem, 
but even more so in the east of the city, for the following reasons (Hoffman, 2002):
a) Land regulation: In many sections of East Jerusalem there is no modern title registry. Not all 
landowners are registered in the "Tabu" (Land Registry). This may lead to lengthy delays in 
reparceling due to the need to examine claims of ownership and to rationalize the delineation 
of the new tracts of land.
b) Residents show a lack of understanding of the process of unification and reparceling and an 
unwillingness to accept its results. This process means that some owners receive plots in 
different locations than their original plots, and find this difficult to accept.
c) The areas earmarked for unification and reparceling are compounds including a large number 
of plots and owners. Since it is impossible to reach consensus among all the landowners, the 
plans are prepared without the owners' consent. This process leads to numerous objections 
from residents, delaying the approval of the plan for lengthy periods. 
The  detailed  plans  for  Beit  Hanina,  Shu'fat  and  Kafr  Aqab  all  include  extensive  areas 
earmarked for  unification  and reparceling.  Indeed,  most  of  the available  areas  that  offer a 
potential for new construction are defined as compounds for unification and reparceling. The 
result is that building in these areas has been completely frozen pending approval of the plans - 
again, one must recall that this process may take years. Plan 3458A for Bayt Hanina earmarks 
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12 compounds for reparceling, with a total area of approximately 710 dunams. Plan 3457A for 
Beit Hanina earmarks 9 compounds for reparceling, with a total area of approximately 600 
dunams. Plan 3456A for Shu'fat earmarks 23 compounds for reparceling, with a total area of 
approximately 623 dunams  (Arnon,  1998).  These conditions delay development  since the 
bureaucratic procedures are extremely time-consuming, see figure 2.4. 
2.4.1.2   Establishment of the height of adjacent roads as a condition for granting building permits
Several plans condition the granting of building permits on the establishment of the height 
of roads bordering the relevant site. The plan for Isawiya is an example: It includes  a large 
number of new roads that have not yet been planned and whose vertical profile (elevations) 
Most of the plans for East Jerusalem establish special conditions for obtaining 
building permits on plots of more than one dunam
Plans for Arab A-
Sawahara, Isawiyah and 
Abu Tor state that the 
granting of building permits 
for plots larger than one 
dunam will require the 
approval of the local 
committee of a building and 
development plan for the 
plot or the submission of a 
plan for the parceling of the 
plot.
Plan for Arab A-
Sawahara determines that 
for plots larger than 6 
dunams, a condition for 
the granting of a building 
permit will be the 
depositing and approval 
of a detailed plan 
according to the legal 
provisions.
Plan 3085A for A-Sheikh 
determines that for plots 
larger than 3 dunams a 
detailed plan will be 
submitted to the 
committee including 
allocations for public 
uses.
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Figure 2.4: Special conditions for obtaining building permits on plots of more than one dunam
Source: Researcher.
* Information by (Hoffman, 2002).
has not  been established. This restriction will delay the provision of building permits for a 
long time.
2.4.1.3   Restriction on building extensions to existing buildings in open green spaces
The  plans  for  Arab  A-Sawahara'  and  for  the  Arab  neighborhoods  of  North  Jerusalem 
determines  that  any additions  to  "lawful"  existing  buildings  in  open green spaces  will  be 
prohibited,  with  the  exception  of  extensions  required  for  the  purpose  of  sanitary 
improvements to an existing building. In Arab A-Sawahara, for example, many buildings exist 
within the open green space; some of the buildings are very old. In practice this  condition 
prevents extensions since most of the buildings were established unlawfully.
2.4.2   Legal, bureaucratic and financial problems
2.4.2.1   Land ownership and the problem of "absenteeism"
Most of the land in East Jerusalem has never been registered in a modern title registry. The 
large number of landowners and inheritors means that providing the proof of  ownership, 
necessary in order to receive a building permit, is a lengthy, complex and expensive process. 
In areas that have not been registered in the “Tabu”, landowners must  provide evidence of 
ownership from the property tax authorities (property tax is levied on undeveloped urban land 
with  the  objective  of  encouraging  building).  In  East  Jerusalem  the  possibilities  for 
development have been artificially restricted, yet at the same time a tax has been imposed on 
residents who cannot  build.  The freezing  of planning in urban  areas  entitles  residents  to 
exemption from property tax according to Section 79 of the Planning and Building Law. 
Unlike the situation in West Jerusalem, residents of the east are required to produce a certificate 
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proving that each and every one is not an absentee as a condition for receiving a building 
permit. For this purpose, even a landowner who has moved to the West Bank, but within view 
of his plot in Jerusalem, is considered an "absentee" landowner (Arnon, 1998).
2.4.2.2   Development levies
All residents of East Jerusalem must pay development levies (sewage, roads, etc.) in order  to 
receive a building permit. While the development levies paid by Jewish and Arab residents 
are identical, the discrepancy in income levels between the two populations means that the 
levies constitute a greater burden for the residents of East Jerusalem. In many cases this makes 
building impossible for financial reasons (Kutcher, 2004).
 2.4.2.3   Licensing process
In many cases the licensing process in East Jerusalem is infinitely more complex than in the 
west of the city, due to problems relating to existing infrastructures and bureaucracy. Most of 
the plans for the east of the city were prepared on the basis of imprecise photogrammetric 
maps on a scale of 1:1,250 or 1:2,500. As a result,  when landowners  attempt to receive 
building permits they often encounter a range of problems preventing the receipt of a license, 
such as access roads that do not reach the plot, unacceptable widths of access paths, steep 
inclines,  etc.  In  many  cases,  planners  find  it  difficult  to  develop  solutions  that  are 
acceptable to the professionals in the municipality, and  residents find themselves returning 
time after time to the bureaucrats' offices. In order to solve problems, residents are sometimes 
obliged  to  submit  local  town planning  schemes  for  their  plot  -  a  process  that  creates  an 
additional delay of several years before a building permit may be obtained. Thus the path to a 
building permit is paved with endless obstacles (Hoffman, 2002).
34
35
Chapter Three
The Unilateral Israeli Planning Policies in 
Jerusalem 


3.1   Introduction
Jerusalem  is  the  heart  of  every  Palestinian  and  is  the  focal  point  for  the  three 
monotheistic  religions.  Since  57  years  Jerusalem has  been  suffering  from the  Israeli 
occupation which aimed at Israelizing the city; erasing its Arabic culture and history and 
evacuating the city from its Arab inhabitants. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss in 
detail the five stages of calculated Zionist planning and implementation of conquering 
and controlling both East Jerusalem and what is today referred to as Greater Jerusalem. If 
one is able to understand the goals of Zionism concerning Jerusalem, then s/he can also 
understand the overall aims of Zionism concerning all of Israel and the 1967 occupied 
territories. 
3.2   Planning Skeleton in Israeli Policies
Since 40 years, Israel had not hesitated from implementing its colonization project in the 
West  Bank,  especially  in  and  around Jerusalem.  Additionally  the  Israeli  government 
imposed restrictions on the Palestinian development in Jerusalem from all aspects: the 
economic development, the physical and urban development the social development and 
the human development. Following are the procedures the Israeli government pursued to 
reinforce the impediments to the physical and urban development (Jacob, 2004): 
 Land confiscation 
 Impose restrictions on land use 
 Constructing Israeli settlements and bypass roads 
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 Segregate Jerusalem from the rest of the occupied Palestinian 
territory 
3.2.1   Land confiscation
More  than  32% of  the  lands  inside  the  municipal  boundary  in  east  Jerusalem were 
confiscated. Jewish settlements were constructed on these lands.
3.2.2   Restrictions on land use
The Israeli government has imposed planning and zoning restrictions in East Jerusalem 
and enforced impediments  on land use.  Israel  formulated  policies  that  restricted  land 
development  and  construction.  These  policies  had  the  aim  of  imposing  the  Jewish 
supremacy in the city and undermining the Palestinian presence in it. The processes of 
obtaining  building  permits  became  long,  tedious,  expensive  and  disadvantages 
Palestinian  residents  of  East  Jerusalem.  Buildings  constructed  without  permits  are 
usually demolished by Israeli authorities.
Following  are  some  of  the  policies  that  were  adopted  by  the  government  in  East 
Jerusalem (Benvenisiti, 1998):
 Confiscating the Palestinian land; nearly one third of the lands in 
east Jerusalem were confiscated to construct Jewish settlements.
 Decreasing the area zoned as residential in the Palestinian 
neighborhoods in the city. 
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 Imposing restrictions on the volume of construction and the floor 
area ratios.
 The Palestinian areas lacked a town planning scheme or zoning 
plans, were only 38% of the remaining two thirds had an approved zoning 
plan.
 House demolition under the pretext of having no building permits 
or for security reasons. According to a study conducted by the Applied 
Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ), a total of 629 Palestinian houses 
have been demolished in Jerusalem during the last ten years.  
 13% of the areas were zoned as green areas where construction is 
prohibited. The green areas will be released to build Jewish settlements as 
was the case with Reches Shu'fat and Abu Ghuneim (Har Homa) 
settlements. 
 Services and infrastructure lacked in the Palestinian neighborhoods 
resulting in under serviced and unhealthy living environment, the pressure 
on Jerusalem's land and natural resources has been devastating as well.
The Israeli policies in Jerusalem have managed to reduce the urban growth within the city 
and  forced  it  to  the  city's  fringes  by  excluding  some  of  the  dense  Palestinian  Arab 
clusters.  An  example  would  be  Al-Ram village  that  lies  just  on  the  outskirts  of  the 
municipal boundary whose population increased by 84 times during the fifty years (1952-
2002) ,Also Abu Dis, Dahyet Elbarid, and Bir Nabala (ARIJ, 2005).
3.2.3   Constructing Israeli settlements and bypass roads
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Israel planned to strangulate the Holy city with Israeli settlements and highways (map 
3.1; map 3.2) thus decrease the possibility of Palestinian development in the city and 
limit  the prospects for East Jerusalem to be the capital of the future Palestinian state. 
Illegal Israeli settlements are being built in East Jerusalem in order to increase the Jewish 
Israeli  population,  maintain  the  demographic  majority  of  Jewish  Israelis  within  the 
municipal boundaries and strengthen the Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem.
The Israeli government had constructed settlement blocks that grow towards each other 
circumventing the Palestinian neighborhoods and isolating the Palestinian city from the 
rest of the West Bank. The first Israeli colonization activity in Jerusalem was soon after 
the 1967 war where the Israeli bulldozers entered the old city and demolished a whole 
neighborhood  to  expand  the  Jewish  neighborhood  from  7  dunums  to  130  dunums. 
Furthermore, Israel was able throughout the past 38 years to get hold of 78.Palestinian 
properties in the old city outside the Jewish quarter.
3.2.4   Settlement expansions
Between August 2002 and August 2004, Israel constructed around 32,632 new housing 
units  in  58  settlements  in  the  West  Bank  (PSBC,  2005).  The  bulk  of  this  Israeli 
construction occurred in settlements in the East Jerusalem and Bethlehem regions in the 
region known as the 'Greater Jerusalem,' which includes the Ma'ale Adumim block, Gosh 
Etzion  Block,  Givaat  Zeev  and Giv'at  Binyamin  blocks.  Approximately  15,400 units 
(47%)  were  added  to  Jerusalem  settlements  and  nearly  10,500  units  (32%)  were 
constructed in the Bethlehem settlements.  The largest expansion projects occurred in the 
following five settlements (most of them are within 'Greater Jerusalem'  region): 
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 Ma'ale Adumim (Jerusalem):  5,712 new housing units 
 Betar Illit (Bethlehem):  4,832 new housing units 
 Har Homa (Bethlehem):  3,692 new housing units 
 Har Adar (Jerusalem):  2,832 new housing units 
 Giv'at Binyamin or Adam (Jerusalem):  1,536 new housing units 
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Map 3.1: Israeli Settlement and Palestinian Neighborhoods in East Jerusalem
Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs PASSIA 2005, edited 
by researcher.
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Map 3.2: Current Road Networks in East Jerusalem
Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs PASSIA 2006, edited 
by researcher.
Current  Israeli  plans  call  for  continued  settlement  expansion  in  the  West  Bank, 
particularly within the "Greater Jerusalem" area.  A report released by the Israeli daily 
Yedoit Aharonot on February 25, 2005 revealed that the Israeli government has planned 
at least 6, 391 new housing units as part of Israel Lands Administration (ILA) settlement 
plans for 2005.  A list of settlements and expansion plans printed in the article, however, 
places the planned expansion at 7,891 units.  Furthermore the ILA plan for 2005 includes 
also the consolidation of 120 illegal outposts in the West Bank, for which planning and 
contractual arrangements will be made. 
3.2.5   The Segregation Wall around Jerusalem∗ 
The segregation  wall  around Jerusalem (map  3.3)  is  planned to  extend  for  190 km,  
extending from the settlement of Har Adar, encompassing the Giva'at Ze'ev settlement 
block, slicing between Palestinian communities, extending eastwards and encompassing 
the Ma'ale Adumim settlement block, and stretching toward the south and encompassing 
the Gosh Etzion settlement block. 40 kilometers of the Segregation Wall were completed 
by mid 2005, 40 km are under construction while 110 km are planned sections, of which 
40 km are for the Ma'ale Adumim settlement block envelope. The segregation wall will 
isolate 230km2. The isolated area includes 30 km2 of Palestinian built-up area, 50 km2 of 
Israeli settlements built-up area while 65% of the isolated area in Jerusalem is an open 
area. The Jerusalem envelope will segregate 45% of the Jerusalem Governorate area and 
13% of the Bethlehem Governorate area. There will be around 230,000 Palestinians in 
 Deep discussion about the segregation wall is in section 3.4
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Jerusalem that will be cut from the rest of the West Bank and will be segregated by the 
Wall.
The wall aims in East Jerusalem, as in the rest of the West Bank, to expropriate as much 
Palestinian land as possible and sever the traditional connection between Jerusalem and 
the rest of the West Bank. The route of the Wall reinforces the settlement blocks and 
expropriates  additional  lands  for  the  settlement  expansions  and  other  development 
projects.
3.3   Tactics in Israeli Planning Policies
The  following  are  the  main  five  tactical  stages  followed  to  implement  the  Israeli 
unilateral planning policies.
3.3.1   Stage 1: Planning
From the beginning, one of the most significant dilemmas facing Zionism was how to 
control the maximum amount of territory with a Jewish population, which was by far the 
demographic minority.  Because Jerusalem was and remains the most extreme point of 
friction between the Israelis and Palestinians (Khamaisi, 2003), it was first necessary for 
the Israelis to develop an extensive and complicated plan to be executed slowly through 
various stages so that the end result was complete Jewish control of all of Jerusalem and 
the Greater Jerusalem area. 
Shortly after the 1967 War, an inter-ministerial committee composed of the Jerusalem 
Municipality, the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Police and 
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the Israeli Army was created to fulfill the Zionist goal of controlling the land and clearing 
away  the  demographic  presence  of  Palestinians.  This  committee  has  fulfilled  and 
maintained its aspiration of "72% Jewish – 28% Arabs." That is, their  objective is to 
ensure that the Palestinian population in Jerusalem never exceeds 28%. A secondary aim 
is to ensure that this percentage declines steadily. 
The mechanisms in place to realize this goal stem from the above mentioned ministries 
whose  work  includes  respectively,  occupying  the  land,  controlling  the  population, 
repressing  any  Palestinian  national  presence,  and  isolating  the  Palestinian  Jerusalem 
population from the rest of Palestinian society. 
The goal of achieving a "United Jewish Jerusalem" includes the land of West Jerusalem 
and the territories of the West Bank annexed to Israel in 1967. Before the war, the total 
area of Jerusalem was 38 square kilometers. After the Israeli annexation, the area totaled 
70 square kilometers. The borders of the annexation are neither historical, nor are they 
borders of Jordanian Jerusalem (Jacob, 2004). They are instead the result of an order 
given by the Israeli government of 1967 to a group of Israeli senior officers: "maximum 
territory, minimum [Palestinian] population." 
After officially and forcibly annexing the land, the next stage was directed at declaring 
the function of the lands. 92% of the "unpopulated" lands of Jerusalem were declared 
green areas. In Israel green areas, a more sophisticated form of land confiscation, are both 
used to stop the natural growth and expansion of Palestinian villages and neighborhoods 
and to eventually use them for the building of new Jewish settlements. From this moment 
on, Palestinians were forbidden to build in Jerusalem; all newly built houses were/are 
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considered illegal and demolished by the Israeli government. If a family wished to build a 
house,  the Israelis  happily and swiftly encouraged them to build just  outside the city 
limits; thus, provoking the first wave of Palestinian emigration.
 The  Israelis  effectively  completed  this  stage  of  Palestinian  ethnic  cleansing  without 
engaging in too much confrontation, for the Palestinians were unaware of the stages that 
would follow. Those Palestinians who left during this stage did so with their Jerusalem 
ID cards and the belief that their access to Jerusalem was not threatened. 
3.3.2   Stage 2: Residency Rights
After  bringing  a  complete  stop  to  the  expansion  of  Palestinian  neighborhoods  in 
Jerusalem, the next stage, implemented in 1995, aimed at controlling the demographic 
issue. A policy of Palestinian residency rights was developed which aimed to deny access 
to all Palestinians who did not possess an Israeli-granted Jerusalem residency ID card. 
Furthermore, of the thousands of Palestinians, who originally left Jerusalem, due to the 
fact  that  they were forbidden to  build  on their  land,  today amore  than 85,000 are  in 
jeopardy of losing their Jerusalem ID cards (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
PCBS, 2006). 
Suddenly, Palestinians, who were not originally from Jerusalem, despite, for example, the 
fact that their spouse was from the city, were denied to lawfully reside (and eventually 
even  enter)  Jerusalem.  That  is,  no  Palestinian  from outside  the  Jerusalem municipal 
boundaries has the legal right to live with family members who have Jerusalem residency 
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Map 3.3: Walls around Israeli Greater Jerusalem, Dec 2003.
Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs PASSIA 2005, edited 
by researcher.
rights; therefore, this policy acts as the second stage of Palestinian ethnic cleansing in 
Jerusalem.  Clearly,  most  married  couples,  for  example,  given  no  choice  will 
consequently move outside the municipal  borders in order to simply live together.  In 
doing so, the Jerusalem-Palestinian must relinquish his/her Jerusalem ID card and all of 
his/her rights to ever live in Jerusalem (Arnon, 1998). 
Residency rights also affect Palestinians from Jerusalem who wish to leave the country 
for business or to study abroad. After a certain period of time (2 years), which of course 
is determined by the Israelis, Palestinians lose their residency rights. 
This stage of cleansing Jerusalem of Palestinians leaves them with two options: leave 
Jerusalem and never return, or stay in Jerusalem and never leave, even for a short-term 
period – and often under appalling conditions. 
3.3.3   Stage 3: Jewish Settlement Building
Stage one and two were cleverly executed by Israel; however, it was not enough to stop 
Palestinian  growth  geographically  and  demographically.  The  third  stage  aimed  at 
populating East Jerusalem area with Jews by implementing Israel’s policy of massive 
Jewish settlement. In 1993, for the first time ever, the Palestinians became the minority 
population (49%) inside East Jerusalem. In other words, the Jewish-Israeli presence in 
East Jerusalem grew from 0% to 51%. Still, it was not good enough, but rather a mere 
start (Kroyanker, 2002). 
The settlements, so-called the "inner-ring," of Gilo, Ramot, Pisgat Zeev, Neeve Ya’akov, 
Atarot Industrial Zone, and soon to be completed Har Homa, have precisely been built to 
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surround all of Jerusalem, including the somewhat large Palestinian neighborhoods and 
villages trapped in between. The settlements gain their strength not by their demographic 
population but rather by their mere strategic location and the series of sophisticated by-
pass roads which both connect them to each other as well as to Jerusalem. The goal of 
settlement  building,  which  continues  to  expand  today,  clearly  fulfills  the  aim  of 
controlling the maximum amount of space or land, by an amazingly small  number of 
Jewish  settlers,  with  a  minimum  Palestinian  presence.  Today  there  are  16  Israeli 
settlements inside the Jerusalem municipal boundary (table 3.1), these are:
 Settlement name Date of establishment Area in 2005          (in 
dunom)
Mamilla 1997 52.7
Jewish Quarter 1968 135.7
Atarot 1970 1377.5
East Talpiyot 1973 1829.4
Gilo 1971 2749.8
Givat Hamatos 1991 287.7
Givat Shappira 1968 687.6
Hebrew University 
(Har HaTzofim) 1968 957.5
Neve Yaacov 1972 1240.9
Pisgat Amir 1985 2515.9
Pisgat Zeev 1985 1545.6
Ramat Eshkol 1968 1118.3
Ramot 1973 3343.4
Rekhes Shuafat 1990 1624.9
Ras al A'mud (Ma'ale 
Ha zeitim) 1998 10.8
Har Homa 1997 2205
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Table 3.1: Israeli settlements inside the Jerusalem municipal boundary
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PCBS, 2006.
There are 32 settlements within the Jerusalem governorate boundaries (table 3.2), see 
(map 3.4), these are:
 Settlement name Date of 
establishment
Area in 2005
(in dunom)
Sha'ar Benyamin 1999 574.4
Mamilla 1997 52.7
Jewish Quarter 1968 135.7
Kalya 1968 867.7
Settler Houses in Old City  19.9
Allon 1990 294.7
Almon ( Anatot ) 1983 807.1
Atarot 1970 1377.5
East Talpiyot 1973 1829.4
Givat Hadasha 1980 313.3
Givat Hadasha B 1991 63.7
Givat Shappira 1968 687.6
Givat Zeev 1982 1545.6
Har Adar (Givat HaRadar) 1986 1192.8
Hebrew University (Har 
HaTzofim) 1968 957.5
Kedar 1984 53.6
Kfar Adummim 1979 751.5
Maale Adummim 1975 6510.4
Mizpe Yedude 1980 310.2
Neve Shamual 1996 391.9
Neve Yaacov 1972 1240.9
Pisgat Amir 1985 2515.9
Pisgat Zeev 1985 1545.6
Ramat Eshkol 1968 1118.3
Ramot 1973 3343.4
Rekhes Shuafat 1990 1624.9
Givon 1978 118.4
Mishr Adummim 
(Industrial Center) 1974 3377.7
Neve Brat 1992 871.3
Kokhav Yaacov 1984 2311.6
Adam ( Geva Benyamin) 1983 1194.6
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Ras al A'mud (Ma'ale Ha 
zeitim)
1998 10.8
 
 
3.3.4   Stage 4: Separation and Closure
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Table 3.2: Israeli settlements within the Jerusalem governorate boundaries Source: 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PCBS, 2006.
Map 3.4: Israeli settlements inside Jerusalem Governorate 
Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs PASSIA 2006, edited 
by researcher.
To  achieve  the  Israeli  planning  policies  goals  in  controlling  Jerusalem  and  making 
subordination in the economical and institutional  aspects, Israel  adopted the policy of 
separating Jerusalem from the West Bank. 
The fourth stage,  implemented  in  March 1993, consisted of  creating a  series  of nine 
military checkpoints around Jerusalem as a way in which to close Jerusalem from the 
neighboring Palestinian cities and villages. The checkpoints which have been established 
for the pretext of "security," monitor and prohibit Palestinian movement from the West 
Bank to Jerusalem and were put in place to delineate a border between the West Bank 
and "United Jewish Jerusalem" (Najib,  2004). They furthermore serve the purpose of 
completely separating the West Bank from the remaining Palestinian residents of East 
Jerusalem. This forced disconnection of Palestinian residents living in the West Bank to 
East  Jerusalem  consequently  aids  in  the  Israeli  goal  of  strangling  East  Jerusalem 
politically, economically, socially, and culturally. In order to "deal" with the presence of 
Palestinians,  the  Israelis  have had to  invent  sophisticated  forms  of  dispossession and 
ethnic cleansing.
Jerusalem  was  once  the  center  of  cultural,  administrative,  and  political  life  for  the 
Palestinians – not to mention the fact that it contains some of the most holy sites for both 
Muslims  and  Christians  (Hoffman,  2002).  Today,  for  example,  Makased  Hospital 
operates at only 65% of its capacity, for those in need of health services are denied access 
to Jerusalem by the soldiers at the checkpoints. This reality raises a serious dilemma for 
Palestinians: on the one hand, they are struggling to keep Palestinian Jerusalem alive, on 
the other hand, their "clients" and those in need of services as important as health, are 
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denied access to the facilities in East Jerusalem. If the hospital, for example, moves to 
Ramallah to meet the needs of the people, they will be accused of helping the Israelis 
cleanse Jerusalem; if they stay they cannot help those who need it most. 
During stage two, Palestinians  were denied the right to  live in  Jerusalem.  Stage four 
ensures that no Palestinian is even allowed to enter Jerusalem – not even for a single 
hour.  The  closure  has  culminated  in  the  fourth  stage  of  ethnic  cleansing,  where 
Palestinian  businessmen  of  all  types  are  forced  to  leave  the  city  in  order  to  survive 
economically.  Furthermore,  East Jerusalem is dying culturally:  why host a Palestinian 
film festival  or music  concert  if  no Palestinians  can attend? The culture  itself  is  also 
being forcibly shifted to the West Bank, particularly Ramallah. 
The closure also accomplishes another important Zionist goal: the complete separation of 
the  northern  West  Bank  from the  southern  West  Bank.  Ramallah,  in  the  north,  and 
Bethlehem in the south, are completely separated from each other as a direct result of the 
closure  of  Jerusalem to  Palestinians  (Najib,  2004).  The  only  way in  which  over  1.5 
million Palestinians can travel from the north to the south is through the dangerous and 
often deadly road, Wadi Nar, which means the Valley of Fire or the Valley of Hell. This 
"trans-Palestinian" highway was [re]built after the closure and remains the only route on 
which Palestinians can travel from north to south. This road is perhaps the highlight of 
the Settlement Tour in that the participants feel the life of the Palestinians as they traverse 
through the valley and around the steep and dangerous curves which does not and will 
not sustain the heavy traffic. The closure has both successfully separated any continuity 
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in the West Bank as well as created terrible roads on which the Palestinians must travel, 
tripling the time it would normally take them to go from Bethlehem to Ramallah. 
3.3.5   Stage 5: Greater Jerusalem
The above four stages cleverly Judaized East Jerusalem. The battle has now shifted to 
Greater Jerusalem (map 3.5). This new concept of  Greater or Metropolitan Jerusalem 
erupted after Oslo when the Israeli governments no longer proclaimed that Jerusalem will 
be forever Jewish but rather that  Greater Jerusalem will be forever Jewish. This stage 
was implemented to ensure that the land already confiscated by Israelis as well as the 
"space"  would  forever  remain  in  the  hands  of  Jews.  It  furthermore  aimed  to  annex 
approximately 40% more land from the West Bank. The implementation of this  final 
stage includes the building of a series of by-pass roads, which connect the settlements to 
each other as well as the settlers. Consequently, the former discussion of withdrawal from 
the West Bank has shifted to a discussion of what percentage of the West Bank can the 
Israelis afford to give to the Palestinians (Kroyanker, 2002). 
Conquering  Greater Jerusalem would not be possible in the absence of by-pass roads. 
The roads are essential in controlling the maximum amount of space with the minimum 
amount of Jewish settlers. This stage is further aimed at the idea of ensuring that the 
Palestinians (the demographic majority in Greater Jerusalem) are surrounded by Jewish 
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continuity,  which comes  in the form of these by-pass roads connected to  the various 
settlements. 
The most important settlement blocks in the "external ring" of  Greater Jerusalem are 
Givat Zeev,  built  on the Palestinian lands of el-Jib and Biddo, which includes Givon 
Hahadash, Mahane Guivon, and Givat Zeev, and Maalai Adumim – the largest Israeli 
settlement outside Jerusalem. Some of the land formerly belonged to the Bedouin from 
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Map 3.5: Projection for the Israeli proposal for Jerusalem’s final status
Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs PASSIA 2005, 
edited by researcher.
the Jahalin tribe who have now been evicted and transferred to the municipal garbage 
dump and are even forced to live in garbage-like containers (Friedman, 2003). 
Maalai Adumim is an excellent example of what Yitzhak Rabin really meant when he 
made  a  verbal  agreement  to  the  United  States  administration  guaranteeing  that 
"settlements would not be expanded substantially." The formal "municipal territory" of 
Maalai Adumim as decided by the Israeli Civil Administration, includes all of the land 
between  East  Jerusalem and  Azaryeh  Abu  Dis  and  the  settlement  of  Vered  Jericho 
(located at the border of Jericho). Every new settlement built in this area is considered to 
be "enlarging, not substantially," the existing settlement of Maalai Adumim (Kroyanker, 
2002). 
The other important settlements in the Greater Jerusalem area include the Gush Etsion 
Block, which is connected to Jerusalem by a by-pass road beginning in Gilo, (by-passing 
Bethlehem and its  surrounding villages).  This  same  road leads  to  Efrat,  a  settlement 
which is  steadily creeping along from south to  north in order to  connect  the Estonia 
Block to Jerusalem as well as to surround Bethlehem. 
3.4   The Apartheid Wall
3.4.1   Background
Until (recently - 2003), when any of the hundred thousand people in Al Eizarya, Abu Dis 
or Sawahre wanted to reach Jerusalem, all they had to do was take Al Eizarya's main 
road, which connects to the Jerusalem-Jericho road, and within minutes they could reach 
the Old City, those days are gone (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, 2005).
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Today the Al Eizarya road comes to a sudden halt at a wall eight meters high, topped by 
rolls of barbed wire. What was once a major artery has become a parking lot for service 
cabs. If you want to get to Jerusalem, you must turn around, drive east to a checkpoint at 
the settlement of Ma'ale Adumim, turn around again and head northwest to the A Zaim 
checkpoint, then to French Hill… and finally to East Jerusalem. 
Even if you take this approach, however, your arrival in Jerusalem – supposing you're a 
Palestinian  – depends on additional  factors.  First,  the  checkpoints:  the  soldiers  don’t 
always let Palestinians through. Second, anyone seeking to enter Jerusalem must have a 
blue identity card (Jerusalemite) and not a green one (West Banker). This measure rules 
out half the people of East Sawahre and the vast majority of those from Abu Dis. These 
may enter only by a special permit, rarely granted.
3.4.1.1 Security?
The barrier looks like it's meant for security. In open areas, it is more than 40 meters wide 
(figure3.1),  consisting  of  barbed  wire,  an  anti-vehicle  ditch,  a  dirt  path  to  pick  up 
footprints, an electric fence, another dirt path, an asphalt road, yet another dirt path, and 
more barbed wire. In built-up areas, it becomes a wall eight meters high (figure3.2).  
57
58
Figure 3.1: Section in the Apartheid Wall in the un built-up areas
Source: The Apartheid Wall report of the International Court of Justice ICJ 2004, edited by 
researcher.
Figure 3.2: Section in the Apartheid Wall in the built-up areas
Source: The Apartheid Wall report of the International Court of Justice 
ICJ 2004.
If the barrier is intended for security, however, its course is very odd. It does not separate 
Jews from Arabs, or Arab villages from settlements. It separates Arabs from Arabs. It 
includes about 60,000 West Bank Palestinians who are not Jerusalem residents, while 
fencing out 26,000 of the 230,000 who are Jerusalem residents can travel anywhere in 
Israel. 
By nipping off  pieces  beyond the municipal  border,  the wall  continues  the policy of 
annexation begun in 1967. Until the June war of that year, Arab Jerusalem amounted to a 
modest  6000  dunams  (1500  acres),  which  comprised  the  Old  City  and  several 
neighborhoods. On the 1967 war's last day, the Knesset decided to annex it along with 
another 64,000 dunams. The guiding principle was this: as much land and as few Arabs 
as  possible.  Israel  annexed the refugee camp in  Shuafat  (it  isn't  including  the camp 
within the new wall), Jabal Mukabir, parts of Al Eizarya, parts of Abu Dis, parts of Beit 
Hanina, 
and parts of a dozen other West Bank villages. Jerusalem, thus enlarged, stretched from 
the fringe of  Bethlehem to that  of  Ramallah.  It  divided the  West  Bank into separate 
cantons, north and south.
Jerusalem had always played an essential role in the lives of the villages surrounding it, 
whether or not these became part of the city after 1967. It has the commercial centers, 
hospitals,  universities,  government  agencies,  news  agencies,  and  of  course  the  holy 
places. It supplied the villages not only with goods and services, but also with great job 
opportunities.  The wall cuts through all that. Take, for example, the tribe of Arab al-
Sawahre. Some of its members live in Jabal Mukabir, which was annexed to Jerusalem 
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Figure 3.2: The 8-meters height Apartheid Wall in an overview of Qalandiya fortified checkpoint 
Source: Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ 2006.
and is inside the new barrier. But others live in East Sawahre and Sheikh Sa'ad, which 
were not annexed and will be fenced outside.  In pre-barrier  times the tribal  members 
could visit one another without impediment. There was marriage, friendship, commerce – 
all the relationships that go to make up a human life. As a result of marriages, half the 
tribal members wound up with blue ID's and the rest with green. Now comes the barrier, 
dividing blues and greens on one side from blues and greens on the other, separating the 
store from its customers, the farmer from his lands, the pupils from their school, the sick 
from the hospital, the dead from the cemetery (Cheshin, 2005).
Security,  as  said,  is  a  pretext.  The  barrier  establishes  the  new  border  intended  for 
Jerusalem. Its purpose is to isolate the surrounding Palestinian villages, cutting them off 
from each other, and strengthen the Israeli settlements, creating continuity between them. 
It will prevent the establishment of Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital. The broader aim 
is to prevent the possibility of a normal Palestinian state or, for that matter,  a normal 
Palestinian life. 
3.4.2   The Convergence Plan
Map 3.6 shows the new Occupation scheme to ensure Palestinian rights continue to be 
negated  and  violated:  the  Convergence  Plan.  The  plan  is  Israel’s  latest  attempt  to 
legitimize the Palestinian ghettos, to permanently annex territory in the west of the West 
Bank, seal Palestinians in from the east, and surround a series of Palestinian Bantustans. 
Within the ruins of these leftover territories is to be found the future state of Palestine. 
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The  project  for  which  the  Occupation  now seeks  the  complicity  of  the  international 
community will (The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 
PASSIA, 2006):
 Annex all territories and resources west of the Apartheid Wall.
 Consolidate the annexation and ethnic cleansing of Jerusalem by confining further 
Palestinian residential areas outside the Wall. 
 Create 3 Bantustans and 5 ghettos in and around Jerusalem for Palestinians which 
fall dramatically short for providing the means by which development can occur, 
whilst denying Palestinians the right to a dignified life 
 Cover up a further 20% increase of settlement capacity within the West Bank.
 Bypass  the International  Court  of  Justice  ICJ decision  on the illegality  of  the 
Wall, as well as numerous international laws and the UN resolutions
 Continue  to  deny  Palestinian  refugees  their  legal  and  just  right  of  return.
The territory  to  be  under  Palestinian  “administrative  responsibility”  reveals  the  same 
structures of miserable ghettos evident in all previous plans: Palestinians will have no 
control  over  borders.  Living  between  razor  wire  fencing  and the  Apartheid  means  a 
prison regardless of its size.
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Map 3.6:  The Occupation’s Convergence Plan
Source:  The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network PENGON 2006, edited by researcher.
3.4.3   Judaizing Jerusalem - the Ethnic Cleansing 
The  Apartheid  Wall  is  almost  completed  in  Jerusalem,  snaking  around  Palestinian 
communities and shutting them out of the city.  Settlements  expand and new colonies 
emerge on the Palestinian lands left isolated behind the Wall. A railway project seeks to 
integrate the illegal settlements into the city.
 In East Jerusalem - like the rest of Palestine - life and existence is suffocated into ever-
smaller ghettos and expulsion an imminent threat.  For over a thousand years the city has 
been a hub of cultural, religious and social activity. It reflected a diversity of cultures, a 
rich  ethnic  diversity.   However,  enormous  changes  since  1948  threaten  not  only  to 
destroy the unique fabric of the city, but the rights of the Palestinian people to reside in 
their capital. Jerusalem has always been a central demand of Zionist ideology and leaders 
who wished to see it cleansed of Palestinians for Jewish settlers. That demand is now 
becoming a reality (The Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ,2005).
3.4.3.1   The Judaization of Jerusalem since 1948
Destruction in the Old City directly after the 1967 saw the demolition of the Maghariba 
Quarter  containing  125  houses  for  a  plaza  for  the  Western  Wall.  Meanwhile,  West 
Jerusalem  was  cleansed  of  its  Palestinian  residents  in  the  first  half  of  1948.  Its 
Judaization was secured by the forced expulsion of approximately 80,000 Palestinians 
from  their  homes  and  properties.  38  Palestinian  villages  in  West  Jerusalem  were 
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destroyed  during  the  1948  war.  Numerous  settlements  were  built  on  the  ruins  and 
occupied lands of these villages (The Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ,2005).
The  creation  of  the  "Jewish  Quarter"  in  the  Old  City  came  from  the  transfer  of 
Palestinians from their homes and from the confiscation of property for the benefit of 
Jews.  More  settlements  sprang  up  around  Jerusalem,  on  land  confiscated  from  the 
districts  of  Ramallah  and  Bethlehem.  Their  presence  isolated  remaining  Palestinian 
neighborhoods in Jerusalem and formed a physical outer ring around the city. This cuts 
Palestinians in Jerusalem off from the rest of Palestine (Najib, 2004).
A policy of systematic and deliberate discrimination against the Palestinian population 
was  developed  in  Jerusalem  through  land  expropriation,  planning  permission  and 
building laws. Like Apartheid South Africa, the Occupation uses a racist ID card system. 
In  Jerusalem  Palestinians  hold  "temporary  residency"  ID  and  are  subjugated  to 
discriminatory  laws  and  taxes.  Moreover,  hundreds  of  Palestinians  have  these  IDs 
revoked on a yearly basis, reflecting a common tactic used to drive Palestinians out of the 
capital (Najib, 2004).
In a rapid amount of time the Occupation constructed an illegal settlement municipality 
of Jerusalem at odds with international law and the rights of the Palestinian people. Over 
half of the Occupation municipality today was not part of the city before 1967, but parts 
of Bethlehem and 28 other West Bank towns.
During  the  Oslo  process  new  measures  were  taken  to  shut  Palestinians  out  of  their 
capital. Checkpoints were placed on the entrances to the city. Palestinians in Gaza and the 
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West Bank were refused entry.  After the outbreak of the Intifada (September,  2001), 
Palestinians in Jerusalem have been forbidden to enter West Bank except for Ramallah. A 
steady  exodus  of  Palestinian  organizations  and  commerce  began  from the  centre  of 
Jerusalem into outlying areas such as Abu Dis, Ezawiya, Beir Naballa and Al-Ram so 
they could continue to operate (Kutcher, 2004). The social and cultural life of the city 
began to  disintegrate  under  the Occupation closures and continued the suffocation of 
Palestinian areas.
3.4.3.2   The Segregation Wall
Once the wall is finished throughout Jerusalem it will total 181km. By December 2005, 
over 130km of the 8-meter high concrete structure had been constructed. Completion by 
early 2006 has left the majority of Palestinians in and around Jerusalem – around 190,000 
people - facing two options. To stay in Jerusalem's ghetto neighborhoods, subjected to 
high Occupation taxes, imprisoned by Walls and a life under siege. Secondly, exile into 
what remains of the West Bank and Gaza or abroad, and permanent loss of the right to 
live in the Palestinian capital (McBlack, 2004).
Given that Palestinians rely on Jerusalem for employment, basic services and education, 
the  Wall  is  beginning  to  depopulate  these  villages  as  well  as  tearing  families  and 
communities apart. In the last months (of the year 2006) 80% of the population of West 
Esawiya  village have deserted their  homes in order to remain in Jerusalem. Out of a 
population of 5000 people, only around 1000 Palestinians now remain in this village and 
65
with the wall's completion they will be prevented from entering Jerusalem (Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics PCBS 2006).
The Wall around Jerusalem ensures the annexation of all the settlement blocs around the 
city (also known as "the Jerusalem Envelope") and their expansion on the Palestinian 
lands  stolen  by  the  Wall.  A chain  of  181  Km,  the  concrete  Wall  forms  a  series  of 
ghettoized Palestinian neighborhood Palestinians are being shut in by the Wall and the 
settler  roads into 4 main ghettos (The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of 
International Affairs PASSIA, 2006):
Northwest Beit Duqqu, Beit Ijza, Qbeba, Beit Sourik, Beit Anan, and Qatana will be 
merged into one ghetto. Occupation Forces have confiscated and isolated 14,669 dunums 
from these villages. The North West ghetto has lost 5 martyrs so far in demonstrations 
against the Apartheid Wall.
North Beit Hanina, Qalandiya, Beir Nabala, al- Jeeb and Jodaira form a ghetto. Between 
them the villages will lose at least 10635 dunums from the Wall.
East where Ar-Ram, Jaba', Hizma, and Shoffat form a ghetto, isolated from 6500 dunums 
of their lands.
Southeast Abu Dis, Anata and Eizarya Ghetto where the 8-meter high concrete wall runs 
through the school playground sealing off around 13,000 dunums for Maale Adumim.
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Map 3.7:  The Apartheid Wall in Jerusalem
Source:  The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network PENGON 2006, edited by researcher.
3.4.3.3   Major Impact on the segregation plan on Jerusalem Governorate 
The construction of the segregation wall has negative impacts on the economical, social 
as well as environmental aspects of the Palestinians’ lives. Following is a summary of 
those major impacts (Geopolitical Status in Jerusalem Governorate –Applied Research 
Institute Jerusalem 2006).
3.4.3.3.1   Political impacts
 For  the  second time,  Israel  will  have  redrawn unilaterally  the  political 
boundary of occupied Jerusalem.
 the  segregation  wall  will  manipulate  the  geographical  balance  of  the 
governorate with more than 44% of its area taken in towards Israel, thus 
forces Jewish majority to the city’s demography.
 The  plan  will  serve  the  organic  tie  between  Jerusalem  and  other 
Palestinian Governorate.
3.4.3.3.2   Economic impacts
 The segregation  plan stands  to  cause  severe  damage to  the  Palestinian 
agriculture  sector  and  to  the  Palestinian  farmers  as  a  result  of  land 
confiscation and the constraints imposed on mobility and marketing.
 Israel maintains control over the Palestinian trade and tourism.
 Increase the unemployment and poverty levels.
 Inflammation  in  land  prices  and  more  diminishing  investment 
opportunities.
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3.4.3.3.3   Impacts on social life
 Thousands  of  Palestinian  citizens  will  be  cut-off  from the  main  urban 
centres where health, educational and social services located.
 Harsh  measures  are  imposed  on  Palestinian  mobility  and  movement, 
transportation from or to the segregated areas will be extremely difficult.
 Increased urbanization pressure and population densities.
 Palestinian Christian and Muslims will not have access to the holy sites in 
Jerusalem unless they have special permits to enter Jerusalem issued by 
the Israeli civil administration.
3.4.3.3.4   Impacts on the Palestinian Environment
 Decline the space area designated for landfills and wastewater treatment 
sites.
 Diminish in area designated as natural reservations, forests, pastures, open 
spaces, and recreation.
 Los of grazing area and increase in desertification.
 Distort wildlife cycle and cuts-off different kinds of animals from their 
natural habitat particularly during migration seasons.
 The segregation plan is altering the Palestinian natural landscape.
 Many archaeological and historical related to Palestinian cultural heritage 
will be segregated behind the wall.
 Loss of open space which poses a threat to the sustainability of the urban 
and rural areas as well as a threat to more loss of the natural resources and 
biodiversity.
3.4.4   The New Israeli Disengagement Plan 
The New Disengagement Plan (map 3.8) shows the completed sections of the Apartheid 
Wall in the northern West Bank (in black) and the remaining planned sections in blue. 
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The Occupation’s first phase of the Wall in the northern West Bank, from Zububa village 
in the Jenin district to Masha village in the south of the Qalqiliya district, resulted in 51 
villages losing most of their agricultural lands behind the Wall. In villages like Jayyus in 
Qalqilya and Qaffin in Tulkarem, the Wall annexed some of the most fertile lands in the 
West Bank, leaving Palestinians with nothing. Here Israeli settlements like Alfe Minashe 
are expanding on lands isolated behind the Wall, while a new settlement is now under 
construction  just  behind  the  Wall  on  the  isolated  lands  of  Jayyus  (The Palestinian 
Environmental NGOs Network PENGON 2005).
The Occupation Government,  in an attempt to conceal  its  colonial  expansionist  plans 
behind the building of the Wall,  claims a new route for the Wall  has been designed. 
However, although some changes in the Wall route were made in individual villages like 
Zawiya  in  Salfit,  and  Biet  Inan  and  Beit  Surik  in  northwest  Jerusalem,  and  in  the 
southern, and western Hebron areas, the Wall route continues as before in the rest of the 
West Bank, annexing some 47% of the West Bank. It will leave Palestinians in ghettos or 
semi-ghettos, linked together with tunnels and bridges under Occupation control. What is 
new in this fresh Wall route is that it  is done under the title of a disengagement plan 
approved by Americans  and Europeans who chose to consider it  as part  of the “road 
map”. What is “new” now is that the Wall is built in line with the Israeli /western visions 
of peace, while in reality perpetuating the Zionist, colonialist project  (The Palestinian 
Environmental  NGOs  Network  PENGON  2005  /  Applied  Research  Institute 
Jerusalem ARIJ 2006). 
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Map 3.8:  The Wall and the New Disengagement Plan
Source:  The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network PENGON 2006, edited by researcher.
The blue line on the map shows the uncompleted planned phases of the Wall as approved 
by the Israeli cabinet on February 20th, 2005. The Analysis of the disengagement plan 
reveals the following (The Apartheid Wall 2005 Report - The Palestinian Environmental 
NGOs Network PENGON):
1. The completed parts of the Wall are some 145 km, while the second phase in 
which work for the new sections of the Wall has started since last year extends 
some 210 km on the West bank lands in addition to more than 90 km for the 
so-called Jerusalem Envelope.
2. The Wall annexes large areas of lands, cutting through the middle of the West 
Bank  in  Salfit  to  annex  Ariel  and  the  Shomron  settlement  blocks,  and  in 
Jerusalem annexing the Etzion, Giv’at Ze’ev and Ma’ale Adumim settlement 
blocks leaving Palestinians in ghettos with no expansion potential. Annexing 
these settlement blocs with the already annexed settlements in the northern 
West Bank will result in the loss of 554 km2 of the West Bank. This is almost 
9.5% of the total West Bank land mass.
3. Excessive  area  taken  in  by  the  Wall  is  located  in  East  Jerusalem and  its 
surroundings,  leaving  the  Palestinian  City  and  its  suburbs  as  a  fractured 
cluster  of  semi-ghettos,  robbing Palestinian  citizens  of their  last  remaining 
prospects for urban development in their capital and fatally depleting the West 
Bank’s capacity for socio-economic rehabilitation.
4. However, Israel does not count Jerusalem as part of its figures regarding the 
Wall and the West Bank. The Wall as projected around Jerusalem practically 
72
annexing all what is included in the current occupation municipal boundaries 
of East Jerusalem (except Kafr Aqab, North of Qalandiya). Yet in an attempt 
to mislead the world about the real size of lands annexed behind the Wall, 
Israel doesn’t include the 70 km2 taken from Jerusalem, totaling 1.2% of the 
West Bank. Furthermore, Israeli calculations exclude the 46 km2 (0.8% West 
Bank) stolen in Latrun. Both areas taken together make some 116 km2, or 2% 
of the West Bank. This 2% of the West Bank should be added to the 7.6 % of 
land annexed by the Wall.
5.  The  so-called  “Jerusalem  Envelope”  extends  form  Beit  Horon  in  the 
northwest of the city to the southwest Kfar Etzion settlement in the Bethlehem 
district. The Envelope will annex the Ma’ale Adumim settlement block, to the 
east of Jerusalem city, annexing 62 km2 (just over 1% of the West Bank), 71 
km2 from Etzion West in southwest Jerusalem, and 31 km2 in the Giv’on 
block northwest of Jerusalem. Altogether this adds up to 237 km2.
6.  In the west Bethlehem area and in northwest Jerusalem two main settler road 
bypasses cut in the middle of the West Bank Highway 60 (Beit Jala-Khadr) 
and Highway 443 (South of Rafat), functioning as separation and ghettoizing 
tools. Both roads, already parts of them are, will be walled in on both sides.
7.  In the Etzion settlement block the wall is projected to extend from Har Gilo 
moving around the Palestinian villages of Walaja (including Ain Juwaizeh) 
and Battir isolating them behind the Wall toward Wadi Fukin where it ends, 
leaving a huge gap with where the Wall is coming from (Bethlehem). This gap 
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can  be  best  explained  by  the  huge  expansion  plans  Israel  has  for  its 
settlements in this area, both West and East of the Green Line (Zur Hadassah, 
Geva’ot and Bat Ayin) which it does not want to become unlinked by a Wall 
in this area.
8.  The Ariel settlement finger, will upon completion annex 123 km2, totaling 
2.1% of the West Bank.
9. The Jordan Valley,  as shown in the map, remains,  with or without a wall, 
under Occupation’s control except for Jericho. Settlements built to the east of 
almost every Palestinian city establish a “belt” isolating these cities from their 
eastern lands and from the Valley. This is in addition to settlements inside the 
Valley itself. Moreover, the presence of occupation military training camps, 
settler controlled water resources and the isolation of Palestinian villages all 
strengthen  the  Occupation’s  control  over  the  Valley.  Annexing the  Jordan 
Valley will mean the further annexation of 28% of the total West Bank land.
10. The Wall as completed and with the planned sections, form part of the Israeli 
“disengagement plan”, considered by the Europeans and Americans as part of 
the “Roadmap” and the Israeli/western vision of a “viable state”. It will lead to 
the  creation  of  a  Bantustan  state.  In  principle  the  Israeli  rhetoric  around 
“viability” serves to legitimize the illegal activities of the Israeli occupation in 
the West Bank. The West Bank is one unit. It forms one piece of territory. Yet 
in  the  realities  being  carved  out  on  the  ground  the  term  continuity  or 
contiguity will never apply except within the misleading rhetoric of the United 
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States  and  Europe,  whose  support  for  the  Apartheid  system that  Israel  is 
creating is vital. They are willing to accept the creation of this Apartheid with 
its cantons, and ghettos and call it a state. 
3.4.5   Settler Roads and Tunnels 
A spider network of settler roads, bridges and tunnels continue to surround Palestinians 
villages  and  towns  further  ghettoizing  them.  The  Occupation  Forces  have  begun 
constructing 24 tunnels for Palestinian use while they remain barred from settler-only 
roads. Such roads, and the obligatory security zones which accompany them, separate 
Palestinians from their lands, isolating villages and towns from each other. Six tunnels 
are already completed, the rest under construction or pending.
 Tunnels and settler  roads will imprison Palestinians in a system of apartheid forging 
scattered and separated ghettos. This network of roads, together with the Wall, encircles 
Palestinians and perpetuates the Occupation’s control over the Palestinian ghettos and 
people. With one road leading to one village, or a group of villages or a whole district, 
the Occupation Forces can invade, bomb or destroy a whole community, and withdraw, 
leaving Palestinians trapped with no sovereignty, no security, and no control over their 
lives (The Apartheid Wall 2005 Report -  The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network 
PENGON).
These roads and tunnels, along with the Apartheid Wall create the borders for a final 
settlement to be enforced upon the Palestinians. The occupying forces call this “a viable 
state” - creating separated ghettos linked by a system of tunnels and low roads controlled 
by  Occupation  Forces  -  satisfying  American  calls  for  “maximum  contiguity”  (The 
Apartheid  Wall  2005  Report  -   The  Palestinian  Environmental  NGOs  Network 
PENGON).
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Map 3.9:  The Israeli’s West Bank Road Plan 2004
Source:  The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network PENGON 2006, edited by researcher.
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Chapter Four
T
Green Spaces and Open Landscapes Policies in East 
Jerusalem
e
4.1   Introduction
Open landscapes besides greenbelts have long been considered an effective tool in containing 
and shaping the urban growth. Other purposes of open spaces have competed for priority 
throughout the twentieth century, which sophisticates the application and analysis of this tool. 
Greenbelts  concepts  were  developed  in  London  and  diffused  to  many  cities,  including 
Jerusalem,  where  the  British  controlled  planning  from  1917  to  1948.  After  the  Israeli 
occupation of West Jerusalem in 1948 and the unification of East and West Jerusalem in 1967, 
Israel has created planning policies using open landscapes to restrict the future development of 
the Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and disintegrate them ethnically as will be shown in 
this chapter. 
Rapid urbanization is a global phenomenon, and cities require an increasing amount of land 
and other resources (Yokohari et al., 2000). Expanding cities also generate air, soil, water, light, 
and noise pollution (Haughton and Hunter, 1996). However, urban citizens expect a high 
quality of life, including good public health, an unpolluted environment, good food and safe 
drinking  water,  as  well  as  possibilities  for  recreation  in  open  green  spaces  (Botkin  and 
Beveridge, 1997). Satisfying these aspects, along with economic and social well-being are the 
important components in the development of sustainable urban environment (WCED, 1987; 
UN,  1992).  This  chapter  explores  the  Israeli  planning  policies  stressing  on  the open 
landscape  as  a  planning  tool  used  to  restrict  the  future  development  of  the  Arab 
neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.
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4.2   Topic Terminology
The study of urban landscape,  often known as ‘urban morphology’,  has attracted the 
interests of scholars in a number of fields; most importantly in geography, but also in 
architecture, planning and, to lesser extent, history. Within geography, urban morphology 
‘belongs as much to historical geography as to urban geography; a fact that reflects the 
longevity  of  the  urban  landscape  that  is  the  urban  morphologist’s  object  of  study 
(Whitehand, 1987a). In particular, its roots are in the morphogenetic research tradition of 
central Europe, dating back to the work of Schlueter. He postulated a morphology of the 
cultural  landscape  as  a  counterpart  in  human  geography  of  geomorphology  within 
physical geography (Schlueter, 1899). Within industrial countries, this made the urban 
landscape a major research topic.  Much of the recent work by geographers and other 
interested in planning and management of landscape attaches considerable importance to 
the  historical  forms  created  by  previous  generation  (Slater,  1990a).  Jerusalem by its 
texture  combines  the  historical  and  the  modern  landscape  perspectives;  this  makes 
planners give it special value.
4.3   Historical Perspective
The history of urban morphology during the first half of the twentieth century,  and its 
diverse research traditions, have been the subject of recent investigation (Whitehand 1981, 
1987a, 1987b; Slater 1990b). Publications dealing with the physical form of urban areas 
became  more  evident  during  the  1980s.  Nevertheless,  they  formed  only  12%  of 
geographical  papers  on  the  internal  structure  of  cities  in  the  middle  of  the  decade 
(Whitehand 1986). By 1990 it was felt that there was sufficient international interest in the 
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urban landscape amongst academics and professionals  in a range of disciplines for the 
international Conference of Urban Landscape which was convened in (Stockholm-1991) 
(Whitehand and Larkham 1992).  Jerusalem has acquired special attention in the related 
planning literature, since it forms an invaluable mixture of the cultural heritage of the main 
monolithic religions on the globe.  
When Ebenezer Howard put forth the idea of the garden city in 1898, he was looking, in 
part, for an antidote to the ills of the urban life. His solution, idyllic in concept, called for a 
town set against a background of the country. Various sources contributed to the thinking 
of Howard and his contemporaries, as the search for an improved community was not new. 
Part of the inspiration may have been the Livitical city of the Bible (Osborn 1969, p. 167). 
Howard (1966, p. 1) began his classic “Garden Cities of To-morrow” with a reference by 
the poet William Blake to the preeminent Biblical city. “I will not cease from mental strife / 
nor shall my sword sleep in my hand / till we have built Jerusalem / in England’s green and 
pleasant land”.
4.4   Policies of Green-Open Spaces
The origins of the concept of greenbelts long predate the initial use of the term (Thomas 
1970). Definition of the greenbelts has clear confusion in Jerusalem, indeed, there is no 
hard-and-fast definition. In Jerusalem no statutory status distinguishes the land included in 
the belt or its use. Instead, the title greenbelt is applied by the quasi-governmental agency 
responsible for afforesting and maintaining a portion of the public land in and around the 
city. The Jerusalem greenbelt ranges from several kilometers at its broadest to as few as 
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twenty  meters  at  its  narrowest  and  covers  an  area  of  approximately  thirteen  square 
kilometers  (Cohen,  1994,  p.  75).  The  benefits  of  greenbelts  are  to  improve  the  city 
aesthetics and health. Therefore in East Jerusalem those green spaces are not noticeable and 
rare. On the other hand, open landscapes are widely allocated, since they damage the Arab 
neighborhoods and devastate their landscape integrity and restrict their future development.
Green area zone in the master plan of Jerusalem is about 12.7 percent of total land of East 
Jerusalem (map 4.1) (Abdelrazek, 2004). The master plan of East Jerusalem (map 4.2) 
shows that all the Arab neighborhoods are surrounded with lands regarded as green zone 
except Beit Safafa and Kafr ‘Aqab. This means that these lands are to remain park zone 
or  agricultural  lands.  On  the  other  hand,  lands  surrounding  Israeli  settlements  are 
classified under planning zone which permit  a future possible  expansion.  In practice, 
lands that were classified as green area in the planning schemes would eventually be 
confiscated  for Israeli  use in  building new Jewish settlements.  This policy is  used to 
block the Palestinian development in one hand whereas to expand the Jewish growth on 
the other.
Greenbelts have been firstly used by the British in Jerusalem.  British plans for Jerusalem 
predated official commencement of the mandate: they had been initiated in 1917 before the 
final breakup of the Ottoman regime in Palestine. With Turkish troops still in the town of 
Nablus,  slightly  more  than  eighty  kilometers  from the  gates  of  Jerusalem,  the  British 
commander General Allenby summoned the city engineer of Alexandria, William McLean, 
to Jerusalem to advise the army on urban development (Kendall, 1948, p. 4).
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Map 4.1: Lands declared green within East Jerusalem
Source: Mapping & G.I.S Dept. of the A.S.S., 2004 
A 
proclamation in 1918 limited construction within two and-a-half kilometers of Damascus 
Gate, and special effort was made to direct construction away from these areas to the east 
and south of the Old City.   The reason for those restrictions was the British desire to 
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Map 4.2   The Master Plan of East Jerusalem 
Source: Ir Shalem, 1998. Edited by researcher.
preserve the special character of Jerusalem, which was best expressed in concern of the Old 
City and its immediate surrounds, the areas of scenic vistas to the east and, to lesser extent, 
the south, and the approaches to the city from the four points of the compass (Cohen, 
1994).
A year later the Pro-Jerusalem Society commissioned Patrick Geddes to prepare a plan for 
the city.  It, like the  1918 scheme, proposed sever restrictions on building immediately 
adjacent to the external side of the Old City wall. That land was occupied in many places 
by ramshackle structures, and the British authorities sought to convert it into strip of green 
parkland that would beautify and set the Old City apart from the surrounding built-up area. 
In  1921  the  Town  Planning  Commission  was  established,  and  initial  ordinances  on 
development were issued. A 1922 scheme proposed by the commission had four zones, one 
of which was a “park system composed of public and private open spaces”. A 1929 scheme 
contained a map labeled “Showing Green Belt Around the City Walls” (Kendall, 1948, p. 
10). The concept of a greenbelt was also evident in the work of the Jewish Agency who 
were engaged in planning new Jewish neighborhoods and communities in Palestine, an 
activity officially sanctioned by the mandate authorities (Kauffman, 1926, p. 106).
Despite the high level of concern for the maintenance of open spaces, the impetus for the 
British planning of Jerusalem in the interwar years was aesthetic and historical. The efforts 
were primarily  for  preservation  or,  perhaps  more  accurately,  restoration  rather  than as 
guides for the evolution of the city.  This position was indicated in Kendall’s comment 
about the lack of trees in Jerusalem. “There can be little doubt that by 1919 the Central 
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Commission and all the persons interested in the appearance of Jerusalem were impressed 
by the inadequacy of tree planting generally” (Kendall, 1948).
The 1944 plan for Jerusalem was intended to address the needs of the city as a whole, and 
discussion of open space indicated a shortage for the entire area (Kendall, 1948). It gave 
details  only for the areas of traditional concern to the British planners and for a small 
number of prominent locations. In addition to continued focus on the Old City and the 
Mount of Olives,, the section on open space described a ring road that was an integral part 
of the green  strategy. Where the road was to transverse existent open spaces, provision was 
to be made to transplant olive trees from the road way to adjacent plots. The road itself was 
to include a bridle path in some areas and to be landscaped so that it would be an amenity 
in the future neighborhood development (Kendall, 1948). 
In the wake of the dissolution of the British mandate in Palestine and the first Arab-Israeli 
war, planning and control of the western portion of a divided Jerusalem came into Israel 
hands, while eastern Jerusalem was under the Jordanian control. Kendall continued to serve 
as  advisor  on  planning  to  the  latter,  but  except  for  some  discussion  of  afforestaion 
bracketing the east sector. Little came to pass (Efrat, 1984). After the war Israel located 
some of the forests and the newly established agricultural communities on the sites of the 
depopulated Arab Villages.   
Main purpose of the greenbelts is to prevent urban sprawl by creating buffer zones that 
define the new zones of urban clusters and make it possible to reduce the side effects of the 
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urbanization process (noise, pollution, etc.), a secondary purpose of is “to provide escape 
from noise, congestion and strain of the city life and to seek recreation in the countryside” 
(DOE, 1962, p.8); in Jerusalem it had a seemingly a contradictory function; Israel has used 
the forest  block as a key tool  in separating Jerusalem from the surrounding landscape 
(Cohen, 1994) i.e. the West Bank to devastate the contiguity between them, and to prevent 
the accessibility of the Palestinians to reach it. 
Although some afforestation was soon undertaken after the reunification of Jerusalem after 
the 1967 war,  it  was piecemeal  and not guided by greenbelt  planning.  Instead,  it  was 
noticeably intended to beautify specific areas, especially along the approaches to the city 
and in the pre 1967 No Man’s Land. An additional function of tree planting was to prevent 
alternative landuse, mainly by the Palestinians (Cohen, 1993).
4.5   Discussion 
The Jerusalem green spaces were planned in Jewish perspectives  that  serve to support 
Jewish majority in the Jerusalem lands. So that, Israel can use those spaces for future uses, 
preventing the amalgamation of Jewish and Arab neighborhoods in the city and merger 
with surrounding settlements (figure 4.1). The Israel Lands Authority wanted to maintain 
or establish dominion over unused tracts that, instead of afforestation, by being put into 
private use would challenge governmental tenure or lead to premature sale and less revenue 
for the state. The Ministry of Housing wanted to restrict for future Jewish settlement and 
neighborhood construction, to ensure distance between these and Palestinian communities 
(Cohen,  1994,  p.86).  Tree  planting  in  Jerusalem  has  an  explicit  function  of  ethnic 
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separation (between the Arab Palestinians and Jewish populations), an example of which 
can be found between the Jewish neighborhood of East Talpiot and the Palestinian village 
of Sur Baher (Cohen, 1993).
Israeli  government  created  sly  mechanisms  and  methods  to  achieve  expropriating 
Palestinian Lands. One of the main methods is green land method. 
For example, 500 acres from shu’fat village were designated as green area in 1968. The 
area was planted with cypress trees and remained untouched for many years till in 1994 
when  a  new  settlement  were  approved  to  be  built  on  these  lands.  Reches  Shu’fat, 
consisting 2,500 units,  was built  as  new neighborhood for religious Jews (figure 4.2) 
(Hodgkins, 1996). 
Most  of  the  East  Jerusalem  plans  allocate  extensive  areas  for  open  landscape  area. 
Approximately 40% of the total planned area of East Jerusalem is zoned for this purpose. 
Construction is  completely forbidden in open landscape area, where the permitted usages 
include forestry, groves, agriculture, and existing roads. Unlike open public land, open green 
spaces are not expropriated from their owners and remain private property (Arnon, 1998). 
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Figure 4.1: Green Spaces are changed to Jewish Settlements; above is the Abu-Ghneim 
Mountain Replaced by Jewish Housing Units.
Source: Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ, 2005, edited by researcher.
The clearest example of this policy is the planning for the Arab neighborhoods of Beit 
Hanina and Shu'fat  in northern Jerusalem (figures 4.3–4.4). When the planning process 
began, extensive areas in these neighborhoods were earmarked for residential construction on 
the scale of  some 12,500 housing units. On the basis of government policy,  the district 
committee decided to restrict construction to 7,500 housing units and to earmark large areas 
for  open  landscape.  Numerous  objections  to  these  decisions  were  submitted  by  private 
landowners whose land was earmarked for open landscape. 
The neighborhoods of Beit Hanina and Shu'fat are located in the north of Jerusalem, to the 
south of the  Atarot Industrial Zone and to the west of the Pisgat Zeev neighborhood and 
Road 1. These neighborhoods form a contiguous Arab urban residential area in the north of 
the city. Three detailed town plans apply to this area; these are based on the general outline 
plan for north Jerusalem (#3000B) approved in 1991. The general outline plan established the 
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Figure 4.2: Reches Shufat settlement that was built on confiscation land from Shufat town 
Source: Halawani, 2006. Edited by researcher. 
population capacity, land usages,  construction densities and road system for the area. The 
residential capacity of the area was based on a political decision and fixed at 12,000 housing 
units, so that the number of additional housing units will not exceed 7,500. The area of plan 
#3457A - South Beit Hanina - is  1,920 dunams. The area of plan #3458A - North Beit 
Hanina - is 3,410 dunams. The area of plan #3456A -Shu'fat - is 1,840 dunams. Total area: 
7,170 dunams (McFadden, 2001).
4.5.1   Beit Hanina and Shu’fat
4.5.1.1   Land usages
The neighborhoods were planned as urban neighborhoods with Ramallah Road serving as a 
commercial urban axis with high-density construction.  The construction density declines as 
one  moves  away  from  the  center  toward  the  margins  of  the  neighborhood.  "Class  1" 
residential area - All the built-up areas close to Ramallah Road are earmarked as a residential 
area with a construction density of 75% on three floors. This reflects the decision to plan the 
area as an urban neighborhood rather than a rural area, and to enable the owners of built-up 
plots to extend existing buildings. This area totals approximately 1,022 dunams or 42% of the 
total area earmarked for residential use. "Class 5" residential area - The remaining areas for 
building are located on the margins of the neighborhood in vacant areas intended for low-
density residential construction: 50% on two floors. This area includes approximately 1,043 
dunams or 42% of the total area earmarked for residential use. Special   commercial   area   - 
All the plots on either side of Ramallah Rd. are planned as a commercial area with high-
density construction: 150% on three floors. The ground floors are intended for commercial 
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use, while the remaining two floors are earmarked for offices, institutions and residential 
use. This area totals  approximately 400 dunams or 16% of the total area  earmarked for 
residential use (McFadden, 2001). 
4.5.1.1.1   Public bui ld ings  - The plan earmarks approximately 390 dunams for public 
buildings,  including  elementary schools,  kindergartens,  high schools,  special  education 
schools, day-care centers, a mother and child clinic and a general clinic.
4.5.1.1.2   Area for ins t i tu t ions  - The plan earmarks approximately 90 dunams for 
existing or future private institutions belonging to the Church or the Waqf (the Muslim 
religious authorities).
4.5.1.1.3   Open public space -  The plan  earmarks approximately  145 dunams,  or 
approximately 4% of the total planned area, for public parks.
4.5.1.1.4   Open landscape space - Large areas are earmarked for open landscape, 
particularly on the western margins of the plan area.  A border has been established for 
construction in this area, beyond which all the land is earmarked for open landscape. The Tel 
Al-Ful area to the east of the area has also been earmarked as open landscape. Plan 3456A 
earmarks 785 dunams, or 42% of the total  planned area, as open landscape. Plan 3457A 
earmarks  642 dunams, or 33% of the total planned area, as open  landscape. Plan 3458A 
earmarks 1,538 dunams, or 45% of the total planned area, as open landscape.
From a landscape and planning perspective large  sections of these areas are suitable  for 
construction. They were earmarked as open green spaces for political reasons. The approved 
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plans have reduced the open green spaces following objections, but in legal terms these areas 
continue to be earmarked as open green spaces in accordance with the general outline plan 
for north Jerusalem (#3000B - 1991).
4.5.1.1.5   Roads - A road system has been developed to meet the needs of an urban area. 
The total area earmarked for roads is approximately 980 dunams.
Following (table 4.1) shows the categories and Percentage of Planned Areas of Beit Hanina 
and Shu’fat Plan
Beit Hanina and Shu’fat Area (Dunams) Percentage of Planned 
Areas
Area Of Plan 7171 100
Village Core 44 0.6
Dwelling Area 4-70%
Dwelling Area 5-50% 1043 14.5
Dwelling Area 1-75% 1022 14.3
Total Dwelling Area 2109 29.4
Roads 905 12.6
Landscape Area
Paths for Pedestrians 80 1.1
Total Roads 985 13.7
Public Buildings 390 5.4
Institutions 91 1.3
Open Public Areas (Parks, 
ATC.)
145 2.0
Cemetery 4 0.05
Engineering Facilities 12 0.15
Total Public Areas 642 8.9
Hotels and Recreation
Commercial Plus 
Residential Areas 
398 5.5
Gas Station
Light Industry
Total Commercial Areas 398 5.5
Open Landscape Area 2965 42.3
Area Not Included In The 
Plan
Area For Future Planning 72 1.0
Nature Reserve
Other Unutilized Areas
Total Unutilized Areas 3037 42.3
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Table 4.1:  Bayt Hanina and Shu’fat Plan categories and Percentage of Planned Areas
Source: Jerusalem Municipality, 1998. 
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Figure 4.3: Bayt Hanina – (Plan #3457A, 3458A -1991)
Source: Jerusalem Municipality, 1998. Edited by Researcher
Scale: 1:5000
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Figure 4.4: Shu’fat – (Plans #3456A -1991)
Source: Jerusalem Municipality, 1998. Edited by Researcher
Scale: 1:10000
4.5.2   Arab A-Sawahara 
In the south of Jerusalem, too, extensive areas are earmarked for open landscape. The plan 
for Sur Bahir earmarks approximately 42% of the planning area for open landscape, while the 
plan for Arab A-Sawahara plan (figure 4.5) allocates no less than 60% of the total area of 
the plan for this purpose. The areas earmarked for open landscape include several clusters of 
existing buildings as well as isolated buildings. Some of these buildings are long-standing 
while others have been built recently without permits. In Arab A-Sawahara, for example, 
built-up areas - particularly on the borders of the built-up zone - have been earmarked for 
open landscape. Zoning as open green spaces means that house owners cannot extend their 
homes or connect to infrastructure services. The instructions attached to the plans include a 
clause stating that  in lawful  existing buildings  within open green spaces,  no  additional 
building will be permitted, with the exception of extensions required for the  purpose of 
sanitary improvements to an existing building. In practice, the use of the word lawful prevents 
any  building  extension,  since  it  is  difficult  to  prove  that  long-standing  buildings  were 
constructed legally, while the new buildings were built unlawfully (McFadden, 2001).
The neighborhood of Arab A-Sawahara is located in the south-east of the city, between Sur 
Bahir to the south, Jabal Mukabir to the north, the city limits to the east and East Talpiot to 
the west. This neighborhood is the largest neighborhood of East Jerusalem and is inhabited 
mainly by origins. The neighborhood is built on a number of ridges separated by dry rivers. 
The total planned area is approximately 4,600 dunams.
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4.5.2.1   Land uses
4.5.2.1.1   Residential  areas  - constitute approximately 24% of the total planned area - 
some  1,109 dunams. Construction is of a rural and low-density character - 37.5% on two 
floors. 
4.5.2.1.2   Pub l i c  bui ld ings  - The plan earmarks  approximately 59 dunams for public 
buildings, including: two elementary schools, two high schools, kindergartens, a mother and 
child clinic, and a youth club. These areas  constitute approximately half of the required 
allocation according to the public institutions program. 
4.5.2.1.3   Open landscape space  - The plan earmarks  extensive areas constituting 
approximately 60% of the plan area as open landscape. The open green spaces form a broad 
band along the city limits, in the wadis and on the slopes between the ridges. These areas 
include a number of existing clusters of buildings as well as isolated buildings.
4.5.2.1.4   R oads  - Two urban roads were planned to cross the neighborhood: the American 
Road from north to south,  with a width of 26 meters, and the Railway Road from west to 
east. Internal roads are planned at widths of 12 and 9 meters.
Following (table 4.2) shows the categories and Percentage of Planned Areas of Beit Hanina 
and Shu’fat Plan.
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Arab A-Sawahara Area (Dunams) Percentage of Planned 
Areas
Area of Plan 4642 100
Village Core
Dwelling Area 4-70%
Dwelling Area 5-50%
Dwelling Area 6-25% 1109 23.9
Total Dwelling Area 1109 23.9
Roads 622 13.4
Landscape Area
Paths for Pedestrians
Total Roads 622 13.4
Public Buildings 59 1.3
Institutions
Open Public Areas (Parks, 
ETC.)
Cemetery
Other Areas for Public Use
Total Public Areas 59 1.3
Hotels and Recreation
Commercial  Areas 
Gas Station
Light Industry
Total Commercial Areas
Open Landscape Area 2763 59.5
Area Not Included In The 
Plan
89 1.9
Area For Future Planning
Nature Reserve
Other Unutilized Areas
Total Unutilized Areas 2852 61.4
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Table 4.2:  Arab A-Sawahara Plan categories and Percentage of Planned Areas
Source: Jerusalem Municipality, 1998. 
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Figure 4.5: Arab A-Sawahara Plan (#2683A -1991)
Source: Jerusalem Municipality, 1998. 
Scale: 1:5000
The following (table 4.3) clears out the excessive percentages of the earmarked open 
landscape areas in some of the remaining main neighborhoods in East Jerusalem: 
Plan Name
%
Residential Areas
%
Open Landscape 
Areas 
Isawiyah - Town Plan 2316 57.9 20
Shaykh Jarrah, Wadi El-Jawz - Town Plan 
2591, 2639 
44.0 21.9
Ras Al-Amud - Town Plan 2668-A 39.6 32.8
Abu Tor - Town Plan 1864-A 42 41.3
Sur Bahir, Um Tuba - Town Plan 2302 38.0 41.9
Jabal Mukabir - Town Plan 2691 20.5 69.8
The previous discussion figures out how do the Israeli planning policies use the open 
landscape policy to limit the future development of the East Jerusalem Arabs neighborhoods, 
as shown in the above table, it is evident how are the earmarked residential areas (including 
the already built up space) are not allowed to be expanded in the future because of the 
excessive allocation of open landscapes in the available free un-built up spaces; moreover, 
these spaces are used for the future expansion of the Jewish neighborhoods and settlements.
Palestinian  development  is  strongly  minimized  through  the  land  use  law  and zoning 
policies  forced  by  planning  scheme  of  Jerusalem.  Israeli  planners  preserved  the 
Palestinian lands virgins and prevented any kind of development until they expropriated 
it for Jewish settlement. In order to legitimize their steps of expropriations, the master 
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Table 4.3: Percentages of the residential and open landscape areas in some neighborhoods in East 
Jerusalem*
Source: Researcher, 2006. 
Note: Plans are with accordance to the general outline plan (3000B-1991) of Jerusalem
*Information by Jerusalem Municipality 1998.
plan (map 4.2) is used as a most powerful means to achieve their control as the next 
analysis indicates. 
The total area of Jerusalem (West and East) is about 126,000 Dunams. The area of East 
Jerusalem master plan is 71,055 Dunams of lands which is annexed to the city, after 1967 
War, including 6,000 Dunams of Jordanian Jerusalem. After the War, Israel confiscated 
about 24,193 Dunams to build Jewish settlements, exploiting the British mandatory land 
ordinance put in 1943 that permit the expropriation of the private lands for public purpose 
(Abdelrazek, 2004). 
This means that 46862 Dunams remained after the expropriation from the total area of the 
master  plan.  Of  the  46862  Dunams,  Planning  schemes  have  been  approved  for  26 
neighborhoods  consisting  of  26,141.3  dunams,  whereas  another  7  planning  schemes 
consisting  of  2,754.1  dunams  have  not  yet  been  approved.  About  9,995  dunams  is 
defined as a green area shaping 35% of the total area of the planned schemes. While 
residential area constitute approximately 32% of the total planned area, some of 9178 
dunams. Figure (2.1) – in chapter two- presents the percentages of approved, unapproved 
plans,  unplanned  zone  and  confiscation  lands  according  to  the  total  area  of  East 
Jerusalem,  and  (figure  4.6)  indicates  the  process  of  minimizing  lands  for  Arabs 
development.
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126,000 Dunams** Total area of Jerusalem (East & West)
There is still  seven planning schemes forming an area about   2,754.1 dunams do not 
approved till  this day,  like Anata mater plan (No.6131) which has an area about 353 
dunams and Kafr Aqab (No.2521B) which has an area about 1933 dunams (Jerusalem 
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52945 Dunams 71055 Dunams * 
West Jerusalem East Jerusalem
46862 Dunams24193 Dunams *
Confiscated Land for Israeli 
Settlements
Remained Land after expropriations
9995 Dunams ***
17969.6 Dunams 28895.4 Dunams**
Green Area
Unplanned Area (Under Planning Area) Planned Area (approved & 
unapproved schemes)
9178 Dunams ***9722.4 Dunams
Roads & Public Buildings Housing Area
Figure 4.6:  Israeli process of minimizing lands for Arabs development
*  (Abdelrazek & Tafakji, 2004).
**  Jerusalem Municipality, 2005.
***  Ir Shalem Institution,1998.
Source: (Margalit, 2006), edited by researcher.
municipality,  2005). In addition to that,  most of planning schemes permits a low rate 
housing density (25%-50%) meaning one or two stories. However, the building density in 
the Jewish areas can reach 200 percent and eight stories. For example a plan for building 
a  Jewish  neighborhood  in  the  heart  of  the  Palestinians  Ras  Al-Amud  neighborhood 
allows for a building percentage of 112 percent and four stories while the plan for the 
Palestinians in Ras Al-Amud permits only 50% percent or two stories (B’tselem, 1995). 
The absence of a town planning schemes and the restrictions of housing density towns 
form obstacles for residents to obtain building permit. 
In normal conditions planning scheme guarantees proper and efficient development for 
residential areas and acts for the prosperity of people’s life, but unfortunately in our case, 
planning schemes are utilized in hindering and limiting the Palestinian development in 
East Jerusalem as seen in this chapter.   
4.6   Conclusion
In  conclusion,  the  Jerusalem  greenbelt  lacks  legal  definition;  therefore,  some  of  the 
greenbelt plans falls within the open-space regulation, which is very powerful in Israel, 
Palestinians protest Israeli use of land in East Jerusalem and the West Bank (Cohen, 1994, 
p.87),  especially  as these uses are discriminative  and paradoxical  with the Palestinians 
needs. Israel uses its planning acts such that it does not need to buy lands to keep them 
opened and use them for its future settlements expansion and establishment; it can easily 
consider  them  to  be  open  landscapes  and  do  not  give  permission  for  any  kind  of 
development  there,  attaining  the  restriction  on  using  the  potential  free  lands  in  East 
Jerusalem and saving the Jewish majority in Jerusalem.
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Chapter Five
i
The Planning Paradigm in East Jerusalem 
5.1   Background 
It is only partly accurate to conclude that the planning defects described in the previous chapters 
are the product of a deliberate and conscious policy intended to block the development of the 
Palestinian sector. It is simplistic to view political discrimination as the sole factor shaping  the 
planning regime in East Jerusalem. Thus even if the policies were changed; the planning and 
development  needs of the residents of East  Jerusalem would not be met  fully.  The planning 
regime created  in  this  area  reflects  a  fundamental  and undisputed fact:  although Israelis  and 
Palestinians have shared the space in the city for forty years, they are not partners in a common 
political or cultural community.  They are not part of the same "public". Planning is the point 
where the dominant Israeli aspiration in the city -the consolidation of Israeli rule over all parts of 
Jerusalem  -  clashes  with  the  Palestinian  counter-aspiration:  a  categorical  rejection  of  the 
legitimacy of that rule. Virtually all else is derivative.
The planning mechanism finds it difficult to cope with the needs of the Arab population in East 
Jerusalem  not  only  because  of  demographic  and  political  factors,  but  also  because  the 
governmental  and municipal authorities address the demands and  problems of a specific civil 
consumer community: the Israeli Jewish public. Even when no deliberate policy of discrimination 
is implemented, the authorities tend to be unaware of the needs of a public that is not part of the 
"civil society" - the Palestinian community. Moreover, the absence of a joint civil society clearly 
reflects  not only the desire of the Jewish majority but also the aspirations of the Palestinian 
minority (Kroyanker, 2002).
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Throughout  the world urban planning is  a profoundly political  field  and Jerusalem is  by no 
means unique in this respect. Planning defines what individuals may do in their own domain as 
well as in that of the public to which they belong; it influences the nature of the public domain; 
and, above all, it determines which individuals and sectors within the population as a whole will 
gain or lose from the planning process. As elsewhere, these decisions are made in Jerusalem by 
means of statutory committees composed of elected officials, civil servants who are subject to 
the authority and instructions of the political echelons, and public representatives.
The Palestinian public has not remained passive or indifferent during the struggle that has taken 
place over the planning of Jerusalem for the past four decades. A single key decision made by 
this public has had a direct influence on planning problems and the way these are addressed: the 
Palestinian public has shown a willingness to make the most  of the rights and entitlements it 
enjoys  under the present  system,  but  only insofar  as  this  does  not  entail  acknowledging the 
legitimacy of Israeli rule in the east of the city. For  example, the Palestinians have refused to 
accept compensation for expropriated land. The price for this symbolic expression of refusal to 
accept  the  legitimacy  of  overtly  political  land  expropriations  has  been  heavy.  The  Israeli 
authorities have been able to expropriate land without paying billions of dollars in compensation 
(Jacob, 2004).
Another example is involvement in municipal elections. The vast majority of the  Palestinian 
population does not exercise its right to vote in the elections for the municipal council and the mayor. 
In this way the residents of East Jerusalem stress their Palestinian identity and the fact that they do 
not  see  themselves  as  "Israeli  Arabs",  since  they  believe  that  East  Jerusalem is  an  occupied 
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territory that must have separate municipality/council than West Jerusalem run by Palestinians. 
However,  they  thereby  reinforce  the  tendency  among  municipal  decision  makers  to  ignore 
Palestinian  needs and demands. These behavioral patterns have had far-reaching consequences in 
various  fields  affecting  the  planning  of  East  Jerusalem  (Kutcher,  2004;  Abdelrazek,  2004; 
Khamaisi, 2003):
5.1.1   The p lan n in g  process
There are little Palestinian representative in the municipal planning institution. This situation reflects 
the Palestinian detachment from the power structures of the city. It also reflects the Palestinian refusal 
to participate in a system viewed as illegitimate by the Palestinian political community.
5.1.2   Financial allocation
The appalling state of the infrastructures in East Jerusalem impairs urban development drastically. 
Israel inherited ragged infrastructures from the Jordanian government. However the situation has 
worsened over the past four decades, due in large part to the unequal allocation of budgets to the two 
parts of the city. Cautious estimates suggest that  only 7% of the budget of the Municipality of 
Jerusalem is invested in the Palestinian  sector, which comprises approximately 30% of the city's 
population. This statistic reflects not only discrimination on the grounds of nationality, but also an 
immutable political law: elected officials are not inclined to promote the interests of residents who 
do not vote.
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5.1.3   The economics of licensing
The licensing  levies  imposed  on  the  residents  of  Jerusalem who apply  for  building  permits  are 
completely egalitarian and are identical  in both sides of the city.  Yet per capita  income  in East 
Jerusalem  is  approximately  one-third  of  that  in  the  West  Jerusalem.  The  determination  of  a 
reasonable cost for services and levies was based on the standards of the Jewish sector,  meaning 
that  many residents  of  East  Jerusalem cannot  afford  to  bear  these costs.  The  authorities  can 
redress this situation only by recognizing the economic discrepancies  between the two parts of 
united Jerusalem.
5.1.4   Land registration
As noted before (in chapter two), the system for registration of land ownership in East Jerusalem 
allows  neither  rational  planning nor  the development  of  an entrepreneurial  culture  among the 
Palestinian public. Comprehensive reform and the regulation of land are an essential condition 
for any change in this situation. However, the introduction of reforms is a complex and sensitive 
procedure that requires at least a minimal level of trust between the authorities and the landowners. 
Given the century-old dispute between Jews and Arabs over the control of land in Israel/Palestine, 
and the real  danger  of  the  loss of land due to the  provisions of laws such as the Absentees' 
Properties Law, there is no chance that Israel would be able to implement the reforms needed. Any 
attempt to introduce changes would  inevitably be seen by the Arab population as a further act of 
"aggression."
Rational planning does not only benefit landowners; it also detracts from their property rights due to 
the need to allocate land for public uses (public institutions, roads, parks, etc.) The rational way to 
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take private land for public needs is through unification and reparceling plans that distribute the 
"damage" among landowners in the most equitable possible way. Even in West Jerusalem such plans 
are usually implemented through official coercion. Since there is no common civil community and no 
relationship of trust between  the authorities and the Palestinian public,  it  is extremely doubtful 
whether Israel could implement unification and reparceling plans in the Arab sector. Without such 
plans the development of this sector will be significantly impaired.
Several hesitant attempts have been made in Jerusalem in recent years to develop a more equitable 
and objective planning policy toward the Palestinian sector. However,  these decisions have been 
perceived as an attempt by the authorities to prove that Israel "deserves" to enjoy exclusive rule over 
all  parts  of the city.  Palestinian  residents  are  willing  to  enjoy  benefits  if  no  recognition  of  the 
legitimacy of Israeli control is involved. Thus, municipal decision makers demonstrate generosity 
toward the Palestinians precisely those situations in which the Palestinians will be unwilling to pay 
the political "price" for the benefits (Arnon, 1998).
This is a zero-sum game in which any gain by one side is automatically perceived as a loss by the 
other.  Therefore,  the  existing  planning  policy  is  virtually  "immune"  to  any  attempts  at 
improvement, however well intentioned. The partial redressing of discrimination might alleviate the 
suffering of individual residents and create a more favorable climate for dialogue. However, the 
problem is not "discrimination" against a civil minority within a shared political community. The 
humiliation and discrimination faced by Palestinian residents of the city do not cause them to aspire 
to  become  "Israelis"  enjoying  equal  rights.  Rather  they  wish  to  control  their  individual  and 
communal life as Palestinians.
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Israelis cannot plan East Jerusalem for its Palestinian residents. This is not because Israel lacks planners 
with the professional skills and public sensitivity necessary for this task.  Rather, planning for an 
entire public must be rooted in the political  culture of that  public.  Thus,  while  changes  in  the 
planning policy in order to promote a more objective, equitable and sensitive approach are a vital 
step, they will not be sufficient to enable the substantive questions of planning in East Jerusalem to be 
addressed properly.
5.2   The limitations of reform in the planning regime
To challenge the existing conditions, still within the existing boundaries it is possible to enable some 
residents to exploit their property assets on a more reasonable basis, while avoiding injury to the city 
landscape  or  to  fellow  residents.  Thus,  for  example,  numerous  compounds  are  available  for 
construction and may be planned without delay. Construction percentages may be increased and 
buildings may be made taller and denser in areas that are already built-up. Areas that have been 
artificially  declared  "green  zones"  may  be  earmarked  for  construction.  Resources  may  be 
distributed in a more equitable manner (Abdelrazek, 2004).
Despite this, it must be stated in the clearest possible terms that even if far-reaching changes are 
introduced within the context of the existing planning regime, this will constitute no more than 
the first step toward addressing the real planning problems of  East Jerusalem, and indeed of the 
entire city.
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The planning regime has created a situation that almost entirely prevents the operation of a rational 
land  market  in  East  Jerusalem,  the  emergence  of  an  entrepreneurial  culture  in  the  Palestinian 
community,  and the development of general planning outlines for the development of this area. 
Expropriations on the one hand, and discriminatory planning on the other, have created a paradox 
whereby land in East Jerusalem is simultaneously both priceless and worthless. The land is priceless 
because these plots are the main asset left in Palestinian hands; it is "worthless" because there will be 
no possibility of effectively exploiting this asset for the foreseeable future. Corrective measures may 
go some way toward meeting individual needs but will not address public requirements; nor will 
they  enable  the  macro-level  planning  of  East  Jerusalem in  a  manner  that  could  facilitate  its 
integration in the planning of the entire city. In order to promote rational planning, the registration 
system must be modernized, unification and reparceling plans prepared, and the Palestinian residents 
involved in the planning processes themselves (Abdelrazek, 2004).
The last point is of crucial importance. The fundamental issues relating to the  development of 
East Jerusalem - the desired urban culture; the integration of the east of the city with the metropolis 
that  extends  from  Ramallah  in  the  north  to  Bethlehem  in  the  south;  integration  with  West 
Jerusalem;  the  development  of  the  area  in  a  manner  consonant with its  unique character;  the 
development of an entrepreneurial culture among the Palestinians, etc. - all require the empowerment 
of the Palestinian public to both plan and implement.
This  empowerment  does  not  necessarily  require  the  sharing  of  sovereignty  over  Jerusalem, 
however it implies in practical and symbolic terms the national identification of the residents of East 
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Jerusalem, including the imposition of limits on Israel's authority  in this respect. Thus, it will be 
impossible to "professionalize" the planning problems of  East  Jerusalem,  and to address them 
thoroughly without political or quasi-political  arrangements relating to functional powers in the 
city (Dumper, 2002).
Granting planning autonomy to the residents of East Jerusalem does not necessarily mean breaking 
the connection with the Israeli planning authorities. Nor does it imply that  Israel does not have a 
legitimate interest in planning matters in East Jerusalem. Such a step, however, would reflect a new 
perception of the Israeli interest: Israel's interest in recognizing the right of a national collective 
that has its home in the city to develop within agreed planning parameters (Dumper, 2002).
If and when such autonomous planning mechanisms are created for the Palestinian  residents of 
the city, this population will, perhaps for the first time, face complex  problems that the present 
regime has prevented them from addressing. Thus, for example, the Palestinians will need to tackle 
such issues as how to maintain the character of the  Arab neighborhoods while at the same time 
promoting  development  and  modernization;  how  to  enable  the  area  to  be  involved  both  in 
developments in the west of the city and in the metropolis on the West Bank; how to rationalize 
the process of registration and  reparceling. With all the political, financial and statutory problems 
entailed; how to protect  Palestinian national interest without threatening Israeli interests  (Friedman, 
2003).
In coping with these questions, Palestinian planners will be obliged to face the changes and facts that 
have been created  in Jerusalem over the past  four decades.  Most of these  changes  have been 
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unpopular  among  Palestinian  residents.  However,  it  is  important  to  stress  that  there  is  still 
considerable  potential  for  the  development  of  East  Jerusalem.  It  is  true  that  the  new  Jewish 
neighborhoods of East Jerusalem have changed the face of the city beyond recognition. Yet it is also 
true that despite strong governmental incentives and the investment of billions of “shekels” in the 
Jewish neighborhoods, and despite the authorities' efforts to limit development in the Arab sector, 
the proportion of Palestinians  in the city has increased from 25.6% in 1967 to 33% in 2002. The 
character of many parts of East Jerusalem has changed, but the Palestinian character of most of the 
area is an  undisputed fact.  West Jerusalem has not been expanded in planning terms,  since the 
Israeli planners want to implant their new Jewish built up areas in East Jerusalem, to diminish the 
Arab existence, and to make Jewish majority instead. The Palestinians continue to be poor in "floor 
space" yet  relatively rich in land that has the potential  for exploitation.  Tens of thousands of 
housing units may be built on this land for the Palestinian population (Dumper, 2002). 
Because of years of closure and the surrounding of East Jerusalem by new Israeli neighborhoods, East 
Jerusalem no longer can function as the cultural, commercial, educational and political center of the 
West Bank, besides there has been severe degradation in all the (social / institutional / economical / 
environmental / etc.) aspects of life in East Jerusalem forcing the Jerusalemites to leave their country 
whether to the West Bank or aboard.
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Chapter Six
i
Conclusions & Scenarios 
c
6.1   Introduction
This chapter discusses one of the most prominent issues that preoccupies the minds and hearts of 
everyone, which is the future of Jerusalem. Discussing the status and the future of Jerusalem has 
been postponed ever since the beginning of the peace process. Nevertheless, many Palestinian 
and Israeli intellectuals do share some common ideas regarding the future of the city. They do 
acknowledge  the  importance  of  Jerusalem in  terms  of  its  historical  and  religious  values  to 
Moslems, Christians and Jews. They are convinced that the three faiths should have free access 
to the holy city, and the best way to achieve this is by making Jerusalem the capital of the two 
separate states, the Palestinian and the Israeli state.
6.2   Literature Review
Dr. “Meron Benvenisti” (former deputy mayor of Jerusalem 1971 to 1978), lists in an article of 
his  three  scenarios  for  the  future  of  Jerusalem.  One  scenario  contemplates  Jerusalem as  an 
undivided capital  of a single  geopolitical  unit  encompassing  all  of  mandatory Palestine with 
provisions necessitated by the city's unique character. Another scenario contemplates Jerusalem 
as a divided capital to two separate geopolitical units with provisions that ensure the continuation 
of  functions  as  a  shared urban unit  thus  maintaining  the  physical  unity  of  the  city.  A third 
scenario contemplates Jerusalem as a distinct geopolitical enclave administered apart from the 
separate sovereign domains of the former mandatory Palestine. This option removes Jerusalem 
from the division between the States of Israel and Palestine (Shtayyeh, 1998).
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“Naomi Chazan”, member of the Knesset from the (Meretz Party), puts forward four scenarios 
for the future of Jerusalem. The first puts Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty with full autonomy 
to  Palestinians.  That  is,  Palestinian  citizens  would  enjoy  autonomy  and  hold  Palestinian 
citizenship while sovereignty remains in the Israeli hands. The second scenario reflects the split 
sovereignty option by which two municipalities are formed, Palestinian and Israeli.  However, 
this  option creates  major  problems in the actual  administration of the city.  For example,  the 
transportation  lines  would  become  difficult  and  complicated.  The  third  scenario  is  joint 
sovereignty and the creation of one municipality with parity and equality,  geographically and 
demographically  between  Palestinians  and  Israelis.  This  option,  though,  requires  the 
modification of the city's  boundaries in order to achieve a balance.  The fourth scenario is  a 
mixed  option.  It  takes  elements  from  the  preceding  two  and  tries  to  construct  an  overall 
approach, which is shared sovereignty. It suggests two separate municipalities working under the 
umbrella of a balanced super-municipality. This option answers the sovereignty question and the 
need for cooperation.  It  thus fosters  integration  and recognizes  differences  at  the same time 
(Amirav, 2000).
In  his  paper,  Dr.  “Moshe  Ma'oz”  (professor  in  history  in  the  Middle  East)  suggests  that 
Jerusalem should remain undivided and should serve as a capital of two states: the State of Israel 
in  West  Jerusalem  and  the  State  of  Palestine  in  East  Jerusalem.  He  briefly  outlines  the 
development of Jewish, Zionist and Israeli positions regarding Jerusalem and tries to suggest 
options for an equitable solution for its future status. Most Jews consider Jerusalem the heart of 
their national, religious and cultural ethos, as well as their historical and eternal capital. Since 
1967, the policy of the Israeli governments, both (Labor and Likud) was to maintain a unified 
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Jerusalem by Judaizing it demographically and politically. Before the Oslo Agreement of 1993, 
Jerusalem was never put on the negotiating table, but Moslems and Christians (in Palestine only) 
were allowed limited access to their holy sites. The Israeli Labor Party is more likely to suggest a 
Palestinian autonomy or self-determination in East Jerusalem in municipal, cultural, social and 
economic affairs, but not in political matters. The Israeli official position, which is supported by 
most Israeli Jews, has not changed: United Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty would remain 
Israel's "eternal and exclusive capital". These people ignore the fact that East Jerusalem has for 
centuries  been  veneered  by Moslems  and  Christians  and for  decades  been  the  political  and 
spiritual center of the Palestinian National Movement. According to Dr. Ma'oz's, most Israelis 
and  Palestinians  agree  that  Jerusalem  should  remain  undivided.  Some  of  them support  the 
creation of two municipalities. Other solutions for the future status of Jerusalem suggested in 
paper are: scattered sovereignty, shared sovereignty, functional or divided sovereignty, with the 
Old  City  having  a  special  status,  administered  by  both  the  Israeli  and  the  Palestinian 
governments or by a representative of the three religions (Ma'oz, 1998).
Dr. “Manuel Hassassian” (executive Vice President of Bethlehem University) suggested a paper 
that attempts to dissuade ways of thought, which approach the question of Jerusalem as a "Zero-
sum conflict" so, his paper tries to propose working solutions to what appears to be an enigma 
without a solution. According to Dr. Hassassian, the only solution for the question of Jerusalem 
is to integrate communities that hold Jerusalem sacred for one reason or another. So far, Israel is 
predetermining the outcome of any future negotiations  on the status of Jerusalem by slowly 
eroding East Jerusalem's Arab identity.  We all know that the status of Jerusalem is the most 
intractable  issue  of  the  Arab  Israeli  conflict,  especially  that  it  is  based  on  the  emotional 
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sensitivity of those who value it. Dr. Hassassian's paper does not reflect any official position, 
rather it's a purely academic work, which attempts to shed light upon the problems facing future 
negotiations over Jerusalem. Exactly as Jerusalem is the heart of the Jewish people, it  is the 
center  of  Palestinian  nationalistic  aspirations.  Israel's  policy  of  annexing  East  Jerusalem  to 
"unify" the city, is nothing less than a deliberate claim to delegitimize Palestinian statehood and 
right to national self-determination. The historical presence of both Christians and Moslems in 
the old city of Jerusalem reflect the fact that they own more than 90% of private land in the old 
city,  but the yearning to be in Jerusalem has always played a central role in Jewish identity. 
According  to  Dr.  Hassassian,  the  question  of  sovereignty  is  one  of  the  main  difficulties  in 
negotiating  over  Jerusalem.  Possible  categories  of  sovereignty  include  excessive  Israeli 
sovereignty,  spilt  sovereignty,  scattered  sovereignty  and  joint  sovereignty.  The  question  of 
Jerusalem is a political one before being religious, ethnic or cultural, therefore, we must seek a 
political solution. Dr. Hassassian believes that the best alternative for a working solution is a 
joint sovereignty approach, which fosters integration, as well as separation. In order to achieve 
peace,  sovereignty  should  stress  inclusion,  equality  and  justice  among  the  three  faiths.  Dr. 
Hassassian's approach calls for the ability of both Jews and Palestinians to build in all parts of 
Jerusalem. This is the only way to integrate communities and to return a semblance of justice to a 
situation that has remained unjust for too long. Dr. Hassassian's paper is an intellectual exercise 
that  attempts  to  outline  the  problem of  Jerusalem in  a  comprehensive  form and  to  suggest 
possible solutions (Shtayyeh, 1998).
In his paper, Dr. “Ron Pundak” maintains the idea that a settlement to the Jerusalem issue cannot 
be achieved without a permanent status agreement. Both Israel and Palestine should agree upon a 
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political border between their sovereign territories. According to Dr. Pundak, one of the most 
complex challenges of Israeli-Palestinian permanent status is the establishment of an effective 
cross-border  regime,  which  provides  for  Israeli  and  Palestinian  security  concerns  while 
guaranteeing free movement of persons and economic factors. Dr. Pundak advocates the idea of 
having a Palestinian State with Al-Quds or East Jerusalem as its capital, and an Israeli State with 
Yerushalaim or West  Jerusalem as its  capital.  He also believes  that  the municipal  border of 
Jerusalem should be expanded beyond the current municipal  borders to include Arab -Israeli 
areas north and South of Jerusalem. Moreover, Jerusalem should be divided into three areas of 
sovereignty:  full Israeli sovereignty,  full Palestinian sovereignty and disputed areas. The holy 
sites within the old city of Jerusalem should be given a special status, for Moslems, Christians 
and Jews should be allowed access to their religious sites (Pundak, 2001).
6.3   Scenarios of Future Impacts
The prospects of a peaceful settlement generated the need for developing a Palestinian vision on 
the future of East  Jerusalem and for a strategy to promote sustained development  and living 
conditions. The following scenarios will formulate this strategy.  The strategy is based on the 
development  potential  of  key  sectors  in  East  Jerusalem.  The  simultaneous  and  integrated 
development of key sectors will enhance the effectiveness of the strategy in generating growth 
and improvement in levels of living.
Given the uncertainties presently characterizing future political developments, the strategy has 
been  elaborated  assuming  two  scenarios  regarding  the  political  situation,  i.e.  a  status  quo 
scenario  implying  continuation  of  the  present  political  situation,  incidence  of  violence,  high 
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security and isolation from the West Bank. Under this scenario urgent problems in the economic 
and social fields should be addressed making intensive use of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) without,  however,  much  prospects  for  sustainability.  The  alternative  scenario  is  the 
settlement scenario whereby progress is made in the peace process, violence subsides, and there 
prospects for increased Palestinian control over Palestinian East Jerusalem.
The sectors being addressed by the multi  sector strategy include the economic sectors (land, 
housing,  urban  infrastructure,  private  sector  and  tourism),  the  social  sectors  (education, 
vocational training, health, welfare and youth), and culture and heritage.
6.3.1   Political situation
East Jerusalem was part of Jordan until 1967, when it was occupied by Israel during the June six-
day war. Within weeks (on 28 June 1967) the Government of Israel issued an order incorporating 
East  Jerusalem within  the  municipality  of  Jerusalem under  Israeli  law,  effectively  involving 
annexation,  though  this  annexation  has  to  date  not  been  recognized  by  the  international 
community. Since 1967, Palestinians have actively resisted the Israeli occupation by boycotting 
municipal elections and, as much as possible continued relying on Palestinian institutions. 
The  political  environment  has  strongly  shaped  economic  and  social  development  in  East 
Jerusalem. Israel  has pursued a geo-political  policy aimed at  establishing a united Jerusalem 
under exclusive Israeli jurisdiction. The policies implemented to achieve this aim have included 
strengthening the Jewish presence in Jerusalem and restricting Palestinian development by large-
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scale expropriations of Arab-owned land, and restrictions on land use and housing construction 
by Arabs (Jacob, 2004).
The political situation has also created considerable ambivalence among the Palestinians with 
respect to Israeli rule. Collective negotiations and legal actions in order to pursue rights from 
government  and  municipal  authorities  are  considered  unacceptable  for  fear  to  appear  to 
legitimize  Israeli  rule  in  East  Jerusalem.  However,  at  the  individual  level  Palestinians  feel 
entitled  to  what  they consider  as  their  rights  under  Israeli  law and is  it  more  acceptable  to 
negotiate with Israeli authorities or use legal means to obtain these rights (Jacob, 2004).
6.3.2   Population and economy
From an economic perspective Palestinian East Jerusalem can be considered a mid-sized medium 
income urban community with a population of presently about 240,000 people and with a per 
capita income of about US$ 2,000 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PCBS, 2007). On the 
social side problems relate to poverty and difficulties in attaining access to social services. There 
is substantial poverty. According to Israeli criteria 40 percent of the population of East Jerusalem 
is below the poverty line. According to Palestinian criteria, only 3 percent is below the poverty 
line  (Applied  Research  Institute  Jerusalem ARIJ).  Of  course  the  latter  estimate  is  based  on 
criteria for minimum levels of living applying to the West Bank and Gaza, where the cost of 
living is much lower than in Jerusalem. The first measure is therefore the most appropriate one.
Israeli’s  demographic  policies  have  resulted  in  a  considerable  shift  in  the  geographical 
distribution of Palestinians and Jews, with Palestinians increasingly concentrated on the northern 
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and southern fringes of Jerusalem and large numbers  of Jews now living in East  Jerusalem. 
Economic  activities  have  followed  this  demographic  trend,  whereby  a  large  number  of 
Palestinian businesses have relocated from East Jerusalem to the West Bank areas.
The development constraints in East Jerusalem have resulted in forcing an increased reliance on 
the economy of West Jerusalem/Israel for employment and income generation during the 1990s. 
More than 40 percent of the workers of East Jerusalem work in West Jerusalem/Israel generating 
close to half of the disposable income in East Jerusalem. Labour force participation is relatively 
low at  39  percent  of  the  working  age  population.  The  labour  force  has  moderate  levels  of 
educational  attainment,  and  most  workers  are  engaged  in  basic  occupations  (Khamaisi,  and 
Nasrallah, 2003).
East Jerusalem has a narrow economic base with tourism as the leading sector supplemented by 
small  trading and work shop activities. The tourism sector accounted for between 20 and 25 
percent of the general domestic production GDP of East Jerusalem in the late 1990s, but as a 
consequence of the Intifada which started in September 2001, the number of tourists visiting East 
Jerusalem declined by close to 90 percent,  resulting in  a direct  decline of GDP of some 15 
percent. The closure of the West Bank has furthermore resulted in a considerable loss of business 
for the retail sector, which catered to an important extent to buyers from the West Bank. As a 
result of the economic decline,  unemployment  has increased sharply to around 15 percent in 
2002 and poverty will also have risen (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PCBS, 2007). 
121
Obviously, the main condition for reinvigorating growth in East Jerusalem is the return to more 
peaceful conditions. Nevertheless, there is also scope for improving conditions and preparing for 
a  longer-term  political  settlement  through  a  number  of  key  initiatives  as  proposed  in  this 
strategy.
6.3.3   Economic sectors∗
An important constraint to development in East Jerusalem concerns the lack of transparency in 
the operation of the land market. This lack of transparency is the result of a complicated system 
of regulation of land use, lack of clarity about land ownership, as well as poor information on 
procedures for transferring and developing land. Therefore, under the status quo the strategy for 
land aims at improving the transparency of land markets by strengthening data bases on land, 
improving co-operation among professionals in the sector, strengthening informal land dispute 
mechanisms and improving public awareness on land issues. Under settlement conditions there is 
a need to set up a formal land registry and a town planning authority to deal with land zoning 
issues.
The poor functioning of the land market also adversely affect the housing sector. In addition, the 
process of getting housing schemes and building permits approved is slow and many projects are 
not approved (as discussed in chapter two). In recent years municipal obstacles have become 
even  more  restrictive  requiring  “Tabu”  registration  as  proof  of  ownership  of  land.  Another 
obstacle is the high cost of obtaining building permits. As a result of these obstacles a large 
number of new housing units are built without permits. Under the status quo the development of 
 The Jerusalem Economical Report, Orient House – Jerusalem, 2002.
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housing and commercial  building development  can be promoted by providing support to the 
design, planning and building permit process for real estate projects and by improving access to 
finance  in  the realization  of  these projects.  Housing  support  should  also be available  to  the 
refugee camps under UNWRA control. Under a settlement scenario the process of planning for 
housing  and  commercial  development,  including  the  issuing  of  building  permits  should  be 
streamlined  by  setting  up  an  appropriate  authority  at  municipal  level,  applying  swift  and 
transparent procedures in processing applications for building permits.
The  Israeli  municipality  operates  most  urban  infrastructure  services,  such  as  water  supply, 
sewage and solid waste disposal. In East Jerusalem access to these services is poorly developed, 
especially with respect to sewage and solid waste disposal. Under a status quo the main option 
for improving access to such services is through the implementation of projects at community 
level. Under a settlement, these services need to be transferred to Palestinian control, requiring, 
however, substantial capability in planning and operating such systems, with adequate attention 
being paid to efficiency and cost recovery. Involvement of the private sector in operating these 
services should be considered. With respect to electricity, improving the efficiency of operations 
of the Jerusalem Electricity Company is an urgent issue, as well as the collection of outstanding 
debts from its clients.
Improving  efficiency  requires  computerization,  training  of  staff  and  upgrading  its  facilities. 
Private Palestinian transport companies largely run urban transport in East Jerusalem. Under the 
status quo better co-operation between operators could result in more favorable conditions for 
operating routes and in better  service to the public.  Under a settlement,  the system of urban 
transport needs to be reviewed to ensure the development of an efficient public transport system.
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Since the early 1990s, the private sector in East Jerusalem has suffered from the removal of 
many businesses to the West Bank, where operating conditions were more favorable in terms of 
less restrictive regulations, lower taxes, lower land costs and lower labour costs. Since the start 
of the Intifada (September, 2001) the operating conditions have further deteriorated. However, a 
substantial private sector remains, in spite of the adverse conditions. The private sector plays a 
key  role  in  generating  employment  and  incomes.  Improved  political  conditions  are  a  main 
condition for private sector growth, benefiting in particular the expansion of the tourism sector. 
With prospects for a settlement, there is also scope for diversification of private sector activities. 
There are good possibilities in information technology IT and various other service activities 
(health, financial sector, business services, and real estate development). Opening up of borders 
with the West Bank will stimulate the retail sector, but also logistics and transport. There may 
also  be  scope  for  taking  advantage  of  East  Jerusalem’s  open  access  to  markets  abroad  for 
warehousing  and  certain  assembly  operations  making  use  of  workers  from the  West  Bank. 
Several  of  these  activities  may  benefit  from  co-operation  with  foreign/Israeli  firms. 
Strengthening links with firms in Arab countries should also be promoted. Under the status quo 
the strategy for the private sector addresses both internal and external constraints, involving the 
provision  of  business  support  services,  linked  with  and  applying  similar  principles  and 
approaches as business support programmes currently implemented in the Palestinian Territories 
by  the  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development  (USAID)  and  the  German 
Government. Assistance to firms should include improving business organization and operation 
with  special  emphasis  on  the  introduction  of  IT,  as  well  as  strengthening  private  sector 
representative  organizations.  It  is  also  proposed  to  improve  access  to  credit  by  introducing 
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special  credit  and  credit  guarantee  programmes  targeted  at  Small  and  Medium  Enterprises 
(SMEs) and micro businesses. Given the cash crunch experienced by many businesses due to the 
present economic depression, there is a case for making such financing available at concessional 
terms  with  respect  to  interest  rates,  collateral  requirements  and  loan  periods.  Furthermore 
improvements  in  selected  business  locations  such  as  Wadi  Al-Jawz  may  be  pursued  as  a 
community  programme.  Under  settlement  conditions,  financial  support  programmes  should 
focus at strengthening Palestinian financial institutions which will then start operating in East 
Jerusalem.  Several  innovative  programmes  supporting  private  sector  development  could  be 
implemented, including the establishment of IT incubators, promoting of crafts for the tourism 
market  and  foreign  investment  promotion.  Plans  should  be  made  for  rehabilitating  and 
reinvigorating  the  Atarot  industrial  estate  for  attracting  externally  oriented  warehousing  and 
industrial activities. 
Many of the problems facing the private sector apply to tourism, being the main area of private 
sector activity in East Jerusalem. Under the status quo, the tourism sector will especially involve 
strengthening of the main representative institution, the Higher Arab Tourism Council building 
on a tourism project supported by the German Government. Other activities to be supported are 
training  of  tourism  workers,  assisting  tourism  companies  becoming  better  organized  and 
efficient,  with  emphasis  again  on  introducing  IT  technology  for  accounting,  business 
organization and marketing. Such support should include assisting souvenir shops selling locally 
produced crafts in diversifying markets. Tourism awareness programmes should be supported, 
especially at schools. Tourism companies will be the main beneficiaries of the proposed private 
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sector emergency loan and guarantee programmes. Under settlement public-private partnerships 
in promoting tourism should be promoted.
6.3.4   Social sectors 
In  education,  the  problems  include  lack  of  access,  quality  and  lack  of  incentives  to  attend 
schools, because of lack of job opportunities. The latter factor results in relatively high drop out 
rates. Lack of access is the result of lack of places in the municipal school system and lack of 
space in schools run by the Waqf/government and in some private schools. Waqf/Government 
and private schools combined cater for about 45 percent of primary and secondary school pupils 
in  East  Jerusalem.  In  both  municipal,  Waqf/government  and private  schools  the  Palestinian 
curricula are used (Margalit, 2006). Under the status quo a school rehabilitation and expansion 
programme  is  required.  Expansion  is  required  to  meet  the  increasing  demand  for  education 
resulting from the increase in the population. A master plan for education should be prepared for 
East Jerusalem, taking into account municipal school expansion programmes in order to assess 
additional  school  expansion  needs.  Lack of  quality  is  to  a  large  extent  associated  with  low 
salaries for teachers in the Awkaf/Government schools. The salary issue is difficult to resolve, 
because  of  the  link  with  the  Palestinian  school  system  and  the  unwillingness  to  introduce 
different salary scales in different locations. Further study on this issue is required. A partial 
solution  may  be  to  relate  higher  salaries  to  higher  workloads  and  incentives.  An  issue  is 
furthermore, how to ensure the future financial sustainability of an improved Palestinian-based 
school system. There is also scope for improving education quality by improving pedagogical 
and  didactical  methods.  Upgrading  and  training  of  teachers  is  an  ongoing  activity  of  the 
Education  Directorate  in  which  also  municipal  school  teachers  participate  and  needs  to  be 
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strengthened. At early childhood education level, teacher training is a priority because of the 
high  turnover.  More  intensive  efforts  are  also  needed  to  pursue  legal  means  in  increasing 
municipal/Ministry of Education financing for education in East Jerusalem in order to ensure the 
right of free education to which also Palestinian children in East Jerusalem are entitled by Israeli 
law. At university level there is a need for strategic study on the role of Al Quds University and 
on  the  scope  of  introducing  modern  teaching  methods  such  as  distance  learning.  Under  a 
settlement  transfer of the education  system to Palestinian control  can be anticipated.  A plan 
should  be  developed  dealing  with  organizational  and  financial  issues  top  ensure  a  smooth 
transition. Main issues will be teachers’ salary scales, other operational costs, and payment of 
fees. 
Fact  finding  on vocational  training  has  found that  there  are  many more  providers  than was 
anticipated  and  also  that  the  programmes  are  varied  and  are  quite  effectively  meeting  the 
requirements of the labour market. Many cover their costs from tuition fees. Over the past forty 
years the Israeli Ministry of Labour has opened several new vocational training centers in East 
Jerusalem  (Jacob,  2004).  In  vocational  training  the  strategy  focuses  on  improving  quality, 
standardization  and  accreditation  through  more  active  co-operation  between  providers. 
Upgrading of equipment  and teacher  training is  a  continuing requirement  in which selective 
support is required.
In the health sector the main issues at primary health care levels are lack of co-ordination of 
health  care  providers.  At  secondary level  there  is  a  need  to  improve  co-ordination  between 
hospitals  and  improving  efficiency  of  operations.  The  status  quo  strategy  focuses  on 
strengthening the primary health care system by setting up an umbrella organisation of primary 
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health  care  providers  and  to  integrate  it  better  with  the  secondary  health  care  system. 
Furthermore strengthening of mental health care and of emergency care is needed. Other health 
problems  which  need  to  be  addressed  include  the  revalidation  for  disabled  persons  and 
combating  drug abuse.  At  the  secondary level  the  strategy aims  at  making  existing  hospital 
services more cost effective by improving efficiency and increased co-operation in procurement 
and use of facilities.  Under a settlement upgrading of secondary hospital  functions should be 
considered in a wider regional context. Further study is needed on how to address a possible 
disengagement  from the  Israeli  health  insurance,  which  quite  effectively  covers  the  cost  for 
medical services for Palestinians in East Jerusalem, and its replacement by a Palestinian system. 
With respect to welfare, the population of East Jerusalem derives considerable benefits from the 
Israeli National Insurance Institute (NII), though access can be problematic. Under a status quo 
strategy there is  little  scope for improving the social  security system,  but there  is  scope for 
strengthening NGOs, which are assisting the population in accessing (NII) benefits to which they 
are  entitled.  There  is  also  a  need  to  strengthen  NGOs  and  community  based  organizations 
(CBOs) which provide other welfare-related services to groups of the Palestinian population and 
youth in East Jerusalem, such as human rights, legal advise, care for the elderly, combating drug 
abuse, care for disabled, and so on. A demand driven approach should be adopted whereby well 
formulated institutional strengthening initiatives and projects can be supported. NGOs should 
have  a  proven  capacity  in  terms  of  organizational  capability  and  financial  transparency  in 
implementing such programmes. With respect to youth the strategy also envisages strengthening 
of  the  Youth  Development  Department  of  the  Arab  Studies  Society  in  supporting  youth 
organizations. Under settlement, the question should be addressed of whether and how to replace 
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the Israeli NII system by a Palestinian system. An option is to continue buying this service from 
the Israeli  NII,  but  premiums may have to  increase  or benefits  may need to  be reduced,  to 
compensate for the likely withdrawal of Israeli government subsidies, which currently meet 37 
percent of the costs of the system (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ). Under settlement 
more  formal  policies  should  be  formulated  with  respect  to  the  provision  of  various  welfare 
services, integrated with those in the West Bank and Gaza, but maintaining considerable inputs 
from NGOs.
6.3.5   Culture and heritage
In  the culture  and heritage  strategy it  is  stressed that  there  are  quite  a  few NGOs active  in 
heritage preservation, which are doing an excellent job (Khamaisi,  and Nasrallah, 2003). The 
strategy focuses on the following areas: (i) preparing an inventory of buildings and settlement 
structures, (ii) conservation and rehabilitation of the cultural heritage of East Jerusalem, and (iii) 
the preparation of a cultural heritage master plan. Under a status quo strategy a key requirement 
for East Jerusalem is to catalogue the entire culture and heritage resource as an essential first step 
to forming a consensus on the present and future management of the resource. This process will 
also  help  to  improve  collaboration  among  culture/heritage  institutions.  Conservation  and 
rehabilitation programmes are difficult to carry out under the present situation, but support of 
NGOs  active  in  culture/heritage  conservation  should  be  provided.  This  support  should  also 
include support for preservation of old houses in the Old City. Furthermore, there is scope for 
organizing  training  in  restoration  skills.  The  present  situation  must  be  used  to  achieve  a 
consensus on the future development of the cultural heritage of East Jerusalem, to be enshrined 
in  a  culture/heritage  master  plan  consulting  the  views  of  representative  culture/heritage 
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organizations. The culture and heritage strategy also includes support for strengthening of the 
cultural life of the city, supporting libraries, exhibitions, other cultural events. The strategy also 
proposes the preparation of a feasibility study and plan for establishing a multi purpose cultural 
centre,  which  would  facilitate  and  promote  performing  arts.  Under  settlement,  realizing  the 
cross-sectoral  potential  of cultural  heritage  will  be both a governmental  and a private-sector 
objective. With regard to the former, an effective cultural heritage strategy will need “joined-up” 
government  and  key  to  this  is  getting  the  right  governmental  structure  in  place  to  manage 
cultural heritage resources. In the context of East Jerusalem this should be a single dedicated 
body with sector-wide responsibilities. It should not be linked directly to other sectors (such as 
tourism or information),  as has happened elsewhere to the detriment  of the cultural  heritage 
resource. A settlement will also offer the opportunity to introduce statutory controls to enforce 
conservation standards across the private sector and thereby limit the damage caused by new and 
unsympathetic building work. Settlement is also likely to make additional demands on human 
resources: key positions in any statutory body will need to be filled initially by cultural heritage 
specialists from the NGOs sector. The goal for cultural heritage organizations in the immediate 
aftermath of settlement will be to work for implementation of the proposals worked out in the 
master plan.
6.3.6   Institutional framework
An important question addressed by the strategy concerns the institutional framework that needs 
to be established to ensure broad Palestinian ownership of the strategy, as well as of its effective 
implementation in the absence of formal Palestinian government structures in East Jerusalem. 
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For actual project and programme implementation existing institutions in the form of NGOs, and 
sectoral representative organizations can be used. However, there is need for a supervisory body 
which is representative of the various groups in the Palestinian community of East Jerusalem. 
This body should be supported by a technical unit “Strategy Monitoring and Coordination Unit” 
(SMCU),  which  co-ordinates  the  programming  and  implementation  of  programmes  in  the 
different sectors, and undertakes public relations in providing information about the programme 
and in mobilizing funding. In the case of settlement there is a need to set up an appropriate 
municipal administration and to ensure its sustainability by mobilizing the required human and 
financial resources. In order to provide the services expected by the population these resource 
requirements are considerable. It is doubtful whether resources raised from local taxes, which are 
already considered high will be sufficient. Additional resources from a central authority may be 
required.
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Chapter Seven
e
Recommendations
7.1   Recommendations for Economic Development
The most  important  constraint  to  economic  and social  development  in  East  Jerusalem is  its 
unsettled political situation and the associated unrest. Also in the medium term developments in 
the political situation will play a determining role in shaping economic and social development 
in East Jerusalem. The development strategy, the feasibility of programmes and projects and the 
institutional  environment  are  all  strongly affected  by developments  in the political  situation. 
How the political situation will develop in the coming years is difficult to predict. During the 
1990s  there  were  clear  prospects  for  a  settlement.  However,  the  second  Intifada  (started  in 
September, 2001) and subsequent Israeli military actions have brought the peace process to a 
stand still and it this stage it cannot be predicted whether and when the peace negotiations would 
be resumed. For the proposed strategy for East Jerusalem, I will formulate strategies under two 
different scenarios regarding the future political situation. These scenarios include:
 Continuation of the present situation, the status quo.
 Achievement of more peaceful conditions and outlook for a settlement.
The implications of these scenarios for strategy formulation are reviewed below.
7.1.1   Continuation of the Status Quo
The  continuation  of  the  status  quo  situation  implies  continued  Israeli  control  over  East 
Jerusalem, isolation of the economy of East Jerusalem from that of the West Bank and Gaza and 
only limited integration with the economy of Israel. Links with the economy of Israel will mainly 
consist of employment of Jerusalem’s workers in West Jerusalem/Israel, but business links will 
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remain incidental as a result of mutual animosity and distrust. As a result of continued incidences 
of  violence  tourism  will  also  remain  stagnant.  Investments  in  the  local  economy  of  East 
Jerusalem will furthermore continue to be constrained by regulatory impediments imposed by 
Israeli  authorities,  as  well  as  by poor  access  to  finance.  Foreign investment  will  equally  be 
discouraged.  The  institutional  environment  for  implementing  programmes  and  projects  will 
remain uncertain. Israeli authorities will continue to neglect services for Palestinian communities 
and vehicles for implementing programmes will mainly be NGOs. Emphasis will need to be put 
on basic needs types of programmes and on emergency support to local institutions for survival. 
The  results  of  this  scenario  are  likely to  be  low or  stagnating  economic  growth,  increasing 
unemployment rates, increased informal sector activity and increasing poverty,  as well as out 
migration of skilled and professional workers, and increasing alienation of young people.
Therefore, as Palestinians we have to make East Jerusalem more integrated in our economical 
activities and investments. So, all the hub centres of the commercial and industrial sectors must – 
if possible - locate their administrative centres in East Jerusalem, to create an economical pole 
there, relating all the commercial decisions and future visions with Jerusalem as an economical 
pivot for the West Bank.
7.1.2   Prospects for Settlement
Achieving  a  more  peaceful  and  stable  situation  will  require  moving  towards  a  political 
agreement between Israel and Palestinian authorities on the status of East Jerusalem, involving a 
substantial and sustained drop in unrest and violence. It is difficult to anticipate what a political 
agreement on East Jerusalem would entail. Over the years, a large number of options have been 
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presented, but none have been agreed, although broad commonalities between different options 
can be identified. However, no speculations on the nature of the political settlement to be made 
will be made here. It will be assumed, however, that it will result in prospects for Palestinian 
autonomy in East Jerusalem. It is also assumed that restrictions on links with the West Bank will 
be reduced, facilitating a more liberal movement of people, goods, services and capital between 
East Jerusalem and Israel. This scenario will also facilitate the provision of donor assistance to 
East Jerusalem. On the institutional side some uncertainty remains, depending on the agreements 
to be reached regarding autonomy/sovereignty. Agreements on this issue will determine to what 
extent Palestinian disengagement  from institutions and Israeli  government services should be 
considered.
7.2   Strategy for Improving the Operation of the Land Market
The issues and problems related to land described above reveal the complexity of the subject of 
land and land use. These issues have a direct effect on private sector development, housing and 
the social sector. In the current situation many of the problems are a direct result of the Israeli 
occupation policies, and are therefore difficult to resolve. There are, however, issues which can 
be addressed even in the current situation which could contribute to a more effective land use:
 The  development  of  a  central  and  integrated  database  on  land  and  real  estate.  The 
difficulty of obtaining data and information on East Jerusalem as a whole or on specific 
lots is an obstacle to the private sector dealing with the issues of land and real estate. 
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Existing islands of data should be included in any new central database. A suitable and 
sustainable institutional set up has to be devised to develop and maintain this database.
 Strengthen  community-based  organizations  to  facilitate  grassroots  activism  and  civil 
action. Through community involvement and co-operation procedural constraints in land 
use  issues  can  more  effectively  be  addressed.  Strengthening  community-based 
organizations to realize better control of the use of land by the Palestinian population can 
be part of a wider programme of support to community-based organizations under the 
welfare strategy.
 Develop and strengthen organizations of real estate professionals such as town planners, 
engineers,  surveyors,  attorneys,  middlemen,  consultants,  developers,  investors  and 
contractors  and  improving  their  awareness  on  legal  and  technical  regulations.  This 
activity should be part of the business support programme proposed under the private 
sector development strategy.
 Strengthening of alternative land disputes resolution means. The Palestinian population 
tends  to  avoid  resorting  to  the  Israeli  legal  system,  but  prefer  using  traditional  local 
mediation.  Strengthening  traditional  mediation  mechanisms  will  make  them  more 
effective.  A study is  needed to  assess  the current  effectiveness  of  alternative  dispute 
resolution mechanisms in Palestinian neighborhoods, as well as to recommend the scope 
for improving these mechanisms.
With Palestinian autonomy over East Jerusalem many of the current legislative and regulatory 
problems related to the use of land can be resolved. The challenge will then be completing the 
land titling and settlement process and integrating that with that of the West Bank/Gaza, as well 
as developing a town planning capability at the municipal level.
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7.3   Urban Infrastructure
In East Jerusalem, the municipality partly controls water supply and fully controls the public 
sewage and solid waste disposal services. Consequently the Palestinian influence in planning and 
implementing improvement and expansion schemes for these services is limited. Lobbying and 
advocacy, especially of community groups can have some success in realizing improvements in 
these  services  in  some neighborhood,  though the  success  of  past  efforts  have  been  limited. 
Through  community  organizations  there  is  also  scope  to  provide  outside  support  for  local 
improvements  in  water  supply,  sewage  and  solid  waste  disposal  in  some  neighborhoods, 
especially  at  the  edge  of  the  city.  Such  projects  should  be  preceded  by  the  conducting  of 
feasibility studies. Other activities which can be implemented include:
7.3.1   Water Supply
There is a need to conduct a study to determine the future water requirements of Arab Jerusalem, 
and to assess the availability of water resources. There is also the need to study the possibility of 
building water reservoirs to respond to the future demand of Arab residents, assessing costs and 
benefits.
7.3.2   Sewage
Studies need to be conducted at neighbourhood level to assess sewage infrastructure needs and to 
identify projects at this level. To implement theses projects a proper organisational set up should 
be  established  for  operation  and maintenance  and  it’s  financing,  including  the  collection  of 
137
charges. Such projects can include sewage infrastructure and wastewater treatment facilities, as 
well as projects to clean up contaminated valleys. .
7.3.3   Solid Waste
At community level, Jerusalemites have to identify technical people able to study and implement 
projects to establish solid waste collection and disposal systems.
7.3.4   Urban Transport
Bus and transit van operators should have access to credit facilities to improve and replace their 
vehicles. Palestinian organisations should encourage operators to establish a code of conduct for 
their drivers. 
In anticipation of a settlement there is a need to conduct further study on the need for urban 
infrastructure  services,  on  how  to  organise  the  operation  of  these  services  and  on  how  to 
disengage them from Israeli control. Under a settlement the scope for investing in urban structure 
will be significantly enhanced.
7.4   Strategies for the Tourism Industry in East Jerusalem
In the status quo to deal with the current emergency situation and to facilitate the reinvigoration 
of the tourism sector once conditions improve the following strategic priorities can be identified. 
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Emergency support to companies in the industry in the form of technical assistance and credit at 
concessional terms to assist companies in dealing with their debts and to assist them in short-
term restructuring.
Institutional  strengthening.  The  current  crisis  should  be  utilized  to  review  the  current 
performance of the various tourism private sector organizations in East Jerusalem and propose 
ways to restructure them and build effective and more responsive associations that will undertake 
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the interests of its members in crisis and during 
normal times. There is a need to strengthen training programs for the tourism industry in East 
Jerusalem These programs should be subsidized and should offer recognized certificates upon 
the successful completion of these courses.
Business  support  services.  Companies  in  the  sector  need  assistance  in  formulating  and 
implementing medium-term restructuring and expansion plans, covering also introduction of IT, 
rehabilitation  of  premises,  marketing  and  legal  advisory  services  to  deal  with  the  Israeli 
regulatory environment. There is also a need for tourism awareness improvement. 
7.5   International level
The recommendations regarding the international community have to contain two major issues:
• The basic issues concerning Jerusalem such as: the occupation,  settlements,  Apartheid 
Wall, and sovereignty.
• Issues related to enhance and support the Arab existence in East Jerusalem.
These recommendations are the following:
139
1- Establishing  Arab  council  devoted  to  Jerusalem  affairs  and  has  a  consistent 
communication  with  Palestinian  institutions  that  deal  with  the  issue  of  Jerusalem to 
negotiate any emerging issue regarding Jerusalem.
2- This council works to activate the issue of Jerusalem as a central issue and an essential 
crucial case to the Arab and Islamic countries.
3- This council  will  establish a fund especially to Jerusalem to encourage the Arab and 
Islamic  governments’  institutions  and people to donate  for creating  new projects  that 
enhance and strengthen the Arab existence in Jerusalem.
4- To communicate with the international community (foreign countries) in order to push 
Israel  to  solve the basic  crucial  issues regarding Jerusalem as the apartheid wall  and 
settlements.
5- Develop an international curriculum about Jerusalem to be taught in the Arabic / Islamic 
Universities and schools.
7.6   Institutional level 
1- Establishing a Palestinian research center under the supervision of the Palestinian National 
Authority (like the Orient House). 
2- Forming a well designed strategic plan that aims to secure suitable and sufficient housing 
units  for  Arab  and to  expand  their  housing  sector  range  to  the  utmost  limit  available.  The 
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following  points  are  suggested  to  take  them into  consideration  while  preparing  the  housing 
strategic plan:
A- Making use of the vacant lands in East Jerusalem by getting building permits.
B- Make use of the available Israeli planning schemes by modifying the capacity of those 
plans to include more Arab residents.
C- Designing plans schemes for the unplanned areas in the master plan of Jerusalem as a 
preliminary step for transforming those areas to residential Arab areas.
7.7   Public Level
Several courses, workshops and discussions should be held to enlighten Palestinian Jerusalemite 
of the following:
1- Using the un-reside apartments and houses in Jerusalem in amore effective way rather than 
leaving these properties empty. 
2-  Encouraging  the  property owners  in  Jerusalem not  to  demand excessive prices  for  rental 
purchase.
3- Enlightening the Palestinian Jerusalemite residents for their rights decreed to them by the law 
from the municipality. 
4- Encouraging the private sector to build multi-story buildings. 
Finally, I believe that the application of these recommendations would grant the preservation of 
the Arab identity of the city regardless the obstacles put by the Israeli planners and government.
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